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In this study I investigate how a firm’s corporate strategic action portfolios, defined as bundles of 
key corporate strategic actions, relate to deregulatory and technological changes, and to firm 
performance. I hypothesize that frequency and variety of a firm’s corporate strategic action 
portfolios increase when environmental changes take place in the marketplace. I also hypothesize 
that the nature of a firm’s corporate strategic action portfolios will be different depending on 
whether the changes are due to deregulation or technology. After establishing the relationship 
between environmental changes and a firm’s corporate strategic action portfolios, this study 
measures the relationship between a firm’s corporate strategic action portfolios and firm 
performance. All else being equal, it is hypothesized that a firm with higher levels of frequency 
and variety on corporate strategic action portfolios will perform better. The US 
telecommunications service industry provides the empirical background for testing these 
hypotheses. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
This study is motivated by a simple research question: to what extent do firms’ different 
corporate strategic actions1
Two properties of a firm’s strategic action effort – frequency and variety of strategic 
action portfolios will be discussed in detail how they respond to environmental changes, and 
, specifically defined as strategic action portfolios, change in response 
to deregulatory and technological changes? 
In this study, I investigate how firms change (Venkatraman & Prescott, 1990) their 
corporate strategic portfolios, defined as bundles of key corporate strategic actions, in response 
to deregulatory and technological changes, and to firm performance. Strategic actions such as 
mergers and acquisitions have been frequently observed and reported in the media. It has been 
debated when and how often firms prefer one type of strategic action, such as mergers and 
acquisitions, to other actions, such as forming strategic alliance, divestiture or internal 
development. While there have been some efforts to discuss experience spillovers (Zollo & 
Reuer, 2001) across corporate development activities, it would be worthwhile to look at the 
dynamic relationships among the combinative capabilities (Kogut & Zander, 1992) of a firm’s 
corporate strategic actions, viewed as strategic action portfolios, and the firm’s survival and 
performance heterogeneity. 
                                                 
1 Acquisitions (including mergers, full or majority acquisitions, and minority acquisitions); Strategic alliances 
(including JV and other equity alliances as well as non-equity alliances in technology, R&D, manufacturing, or 
marketing and licensing); and Divestitures (including spin-offs and sell-offs) 
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work to affect the firm’s performance. I hypothesize that frequency and variety of a firm’s 
strategic action portfolios increase when environmental changes take place in the marketplace. 
Both frequency and variety are two of the most frequently used strategic action measures in 
many other industry settings. In this study, these frequently used constructs are once again 
examined in the US telecom services industry context. After establishing the relationships 
between environmental changes and a firm’s strategic action portfolios, this study explores to 
how a firm’s strategic action portfolios influence performance. All else being equal, it is 
hypothesized that firms with higher levels of frequency and variety on strategic action portfolios 
will perform better financially over time. 
This study further analyzes an interesting nature of firms’ willingness to take strategic 
actions in response to environmental changes. Environmental changes, broadly defined as 
deregulatory and technological changes in the marketplace, trigger firms to take on strategic 
action portfolios both proactively and reactively. Due to the lengthy deregulatory processes (Kim 
& Prescott, 2005) and the extensive nature of infrastructure investment decisions, incumbents are 
better equipped with appropriating their strategic action portfolios in adapting to deregulatory 
changes. On the other hand, in the event of technological changes, incumbents try to exploit the 
existing technologies before they actually commit themselves to any upcoming new 
technologies. As a result, incumbents become more reactive in adapting to technological 
changes. Also, upgrading infrastructure such as telecom networks requires firms to take longer 
time to install new technological standards. As a result, incumbents tend to take their strategic 
actions reactively when new technological changes are fully accepted in the market. 
The empirical setting in this study is the US telecom industry for the 20-year period 
between 1984 and 2004. During these times, the US telecom industry has experienced major 
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environmental changes driven by a series of deregulatory events and the introduction of new 
telecommunication technologies. All these environmental changes have redefined the fast-
growing industry structure and competition, and reshuffle the key industry players tremendously. 
To name a few: AT&T was divested in 1984; in 1996, the Telecom Act 1934 was revised; 
wireless and Internet services became more popular with fast-growing number of subscribers and 
households. Also, convergence between telecom and broadcasting services made the industry 
boundaries more ambiguous and complex. All of these major environmental changes lowered 
entry barriers and caused strategic challenges to telecom service providers such as the RBOCs2
After AT&T’s divestiture in 1984, major incumbents, also known as the seven RBOCs, 
maintained their administrative heritage (Collis, 1991), stemming from AT&T’s century-old 
strategic decision making path. Intuitively, the seven RBOCs’ historic administrative linkages 
would have set each RBOC’s pattern of corporate strategic actions similar. Even more, dual 
regulatory bodies (federal-level FCC
 
to look for main sources of growth. In response to these changes, key telecom service providers 
have taken various strategic actions. 
3 vs. state-level PUC4
However, the industry became more competitive in the 1990s’ as deregulatory and 
technological changes allowed each RBOC to implement different strategic actions. In the late 
1980’s and the early 1990’s, the RBOCs took different action paths for their international 
expansion strategies (Sarkar et al., 1999). Noda & Collis (2001) also depicted multi-faceted 
s) still heavily regulated on the seven 
RBOCs’ strategic expansions, and limited them to consider only a few available strategic actions 
in their main local telephone businesses. 
                                                 
2 RBOCs (Regional Bell Operating Companies) 
3 FCC (Federal Communications Commission) 
4 PUC (Public Utilities Commission) 
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dimensions of market, competitive, and organizational forces where such dynamic interplays 
shaped the RBOCs’ different action paths in deploying wireless services. 
In 2004, AT&T, a long distance carrier after 1984 divestiture, was bought by one of its 
once Baby Bells, SBC. The new AT&T (SBC + old AT&T) acquired another RBOC, Bell South 
in 2007. Verizon, the largest surviving RBOC prior to SBC’s acquisition of AT&T, was a 
renamed RBOC when Bell Atlantic purchased NYNEX and subsequently merged with GTE. In 
fact, among those seven original RBOCs5, there are only three RBOCs (new AT&T, Verizon, 
and Qwest) in operation by 20076
Aside from well-publicized mega-M&A transactions among the RBOCs, other types of 
corporate strategic actions have been executed among the RBOCs and other telecom service 
providers. The main sources of growth among the RBOCs are no longer their traditional fixed-
line telephone services. Today, new services like wireless and high-speed Internet are beginning 
to constitute a major share of the RBOCs’ operating revenues. Furthermore, the RBOCs are 
faced with new groups of competitors such as Cable TV (CATV) operators and Internet-based 
service providers (e.g. Google). For example, US West merged with Qwest, a long distance and 
fiber-optic provider in 2000. Bell South and SBC jointly formed one of the national wireless 
providers, Cingular in 2000, and it later acquired AT&T Wireless in 2005. Also in 2005, Verizon 
acquired MCI, a long distance and fiber-optic provider. Also, global partnerships among major 
global telecom providers (e.g. World Partners and Concert) were formed and subsequently 
dissolved (Lee & Madhavan, 2004). Simultaneously, the RBOCs have added new services like 
. 
                                                 
5 Bell Atlantic, Bell South, SBC, US West, Pacific Telesis, NYNEX, Ameritech 
6 New AT&T is created by the mergers of SBC, Ameritech, Pacific Telesis, old AT&T, and Bell South. Verizon is 
created by the mergers of Bell Atlantic, NYNEX, and GTE. Qwest is created by the merger of US West and Qwest 
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high-speed broadband and IPTV services to their main businesses, while many have divested 
century-old traditional businesses such as telephone directory services. 
These examples illustrate the RBOCs’ strategic challenges in the industry as well as the 
needs for certain strategic actions the RBOCs should be equipped with in a fast-changing 
business environment. In order to sustain a competitive position in the marketplace, the RBOCs 
need to grow by reconfiguring their strategic commitment (Ghemawat, 1991) to new businesses. 
This study assumes that different levels of frequency and variety in their strategic action 
portfolios will facilitate firms’ efforts to reconfigure their strategic commitment. 
Generalizing from the above industry events, I also hypothesize that the nature 
(proactiveness vs. reactiveness) of a firm’s strategic action portfolios will be determined by the 
fact that environmental changes are driven by deregulation or technology. As previously 
explained, lengthy deregulatory processes (Kim & Prescott, 2005) and the existing firms’ strong 
ties with different regulatory bodies, incumbents are better equipped with appropriating their 
strategic action portfolios in adapting to deregulatory changes. Technology-related strategic 
actions (i.e., R&D and technology innovation) had been led by AT&T’s Bell Labs. When the 
seven RBOCs emerged from AT&T’s divestiture in 1984, Bell Labs stayed with AT&T and it 
took time for individual RBOCs to regain technological competencies. Furthermore, they didn’t 
have any strong incentive to be innovative in the heavily-regulated local telephone market while 
key wireless and Internet technologies were led by newer IT ventures. 
The overview of research model is depicted in Figure 17
 
. 
                                                 
7 Environmental changes have direct relationships with firm performance (shown as a dotted line in Figure 1). In this 
study, I focused more on the relationships between a firm’s strategic action portfolios and firm performance in the 
telecom industry context. The relationships between environmental changes and firm performance will be examined 
for the future studies.  
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Environmental Changes 
Deregulation 
Technology 
1 
2 
Figure 1 Overview of Research Model 
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2.0  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The following sections will elaborate on the overview of research model illustrated above. The 
first proposition in this study will be discussed looking at the relationships between corporate 
strategic actions and environmental changes. Various theoretical grounds will be presented with 
their unique arguments in the relationships between corporate strategic actions and 
environmental changes. Next, the relationships between corporate strategic actions and 
deregulatory and technological changes will be studied in detail. This study will further extend 
the construct of strategic actions to strategic action portfolios that consider major corporate 
strategic actions. The second proposition in this study looks at corporate strategic action 
portfolios and firm performance. 
2.1 STRATEGIC ACTIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES 
Environmental changes promote organizational transformation by redrawing industry 
boundaries, shifting the scope of permissible strategic activities for incumbents and new entrants, 
and changing incentives for certain strategic behaviors (Delmas & Russo, 2005; Fuentelsaz, 
Gomez, & Polo, 2002; Miller & Chen, 1994). On the other hand, the choice of strategic actions 
initiated by organizations will constrain the way the environment unfolds. The firm’s ability to 
select the right mix of strategic actions in a dynamic environmental condition can be a very 
 8 
powerful tool to outperform others. Several theoretical frameworks covering such interactions 
with different assumptions will be studied. 
Insights from industrial organization (IO) economics have been extremely important in 
developing strategic management models of how a firm achieves sustainable competitive 
advantage (Grimm et al., 2006). IO economics provides direct insights into how firms can obtain 
competitive advantages through strategic positioning in the context of industry structure and 
pursuing strategies that are appropriate to specific industry structure (Grimm et al., 2006). IO 
economics theory argues that a firm’s competitive advantage is mainly influenced by industry 
structure and a firm’s strategic actions can be emphasized as the firm’s willingness to position 
the firm’s low cost or differentiation strategies within an industry structure (Bain, 1968; Porter, 
1981). 
In case of scale-based industries like the telecom service industry, the industry structure 
would favor the incumbents’ leveraging of their market dominance even after deregulatory or 
technological changes. Representing a more extreme flavor of environmental selection on 
organizational forms, organizational ecology argues that environmental and market conditions 
set the stage for certain firms to outperform others by virtue of their market compatibility rather 
than by their internal efficiency (Carroll, 1993). However, even among incumbents, 
environmental changes influence each firm’s strategic behavior in different ways. Both IO 
economics and organizational ecology do not explain the heterogeneity of incumbents’ strategic 
behaviors in response to environmental changes. 
The strategic choice perspective (Miles & Snow 1978; Thompson 1967) argues that 
strategic adaptation is a dynamic process subject to both managerial actions and environmental 
forces. It implies that management should take into account the multiple ways that firms can 
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interact with their environments through the process of mutual adaptation between the 
organization and its environmental domain. Chakravarthy (1991) provided a framework for 
connecting strategic adaptation to deregulation. Environmental changes, such as deregulatory 
processes, are important attributes to a firm’s choice of strategic behavior since they provide 
both incumbents and new entrants with asymmetric opportunities and threats. In particular, 
deregulation that eliminates entry barriers tend to force incumbents to seek for more deterrent 
activities in order to maintain their current market positions (Grimm & Smith, 1997). Utilizing a 
strategic choice perspective, a firm’s choice of strategic actions is important in determining the 
firm’s performance in a changing environment. 
To further elaborate the dimension of different mix in developing firm’s strategic actions, 
the resource based view of the firm (RBV), an effort to explain competitive advantage as 
acquiring an ownership of scarce and valuable resources and the firm’s manipulating its 
resources, can be explored (Barney, 1991). Environmental changes require a firm to update a 
shared set of assumptions about resources, capabilities and objectives. In addition, a firm needs 
to be more flexible to uncertainties and update a shared set of assumptions about resources and 
capabilities (Clemons, 1997). 
For example, business acquisition, resource redeployment, and asset divestiture can be 
elements of a dynamic process in which a firm changes its businesses by recombining internal 
and external resources (Capron et al., 2001). A firm’s relative strategic position will be affected 
by the types of strategic actions that a firm implements. Miller & Shamsie (1996) found a firm’s 
strategic positioning using different types of resources (property-based resources vs. knowledge-
based resources) would differ when the level of environmental uncertainty had changed in the 
context of the seven major US film studios from 1936 to 1965. Grimm et al. (2005) argued that 
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strategic positions derived from a firm’s mix of strategic actions were another resource that led 
to a better performance. It is possible to see a firm facing similar positioning in a certain industry 
structure may consider using more frequent and more various strategic activities in search for 
better performance. 
Adner & Helfat (2003) emphasized that dynamic managerial capabilities were needed to 
achieve a firm’s sustainable competitive advantage. Firms tend to see opportunities in a 
heterogeneous fashion when a new opportunity arises in a marketplace due to deregulatory or 
technological changes (Delmas & Russo, 2005). For some firms, a few changes to the existing 
resources would be required to pursue such opportunities. They could pursue a different set of 
strategic actions by leveraging their resource strengths. For other firms, making such moves 
would require developing resources that might threaten their existing competencies and 
competitive advantages (Delmas & Russo, 2005). A firm’s ability to formulate and implement a 
different set of strategic actions could be considered as ways to utilize such dynamic managerial 
capability (Adner & Helfat, 2003). Through utilizing their strategic actions, a firm makes 
strategic adaptations to environmental changes that may ultimately lead to better performance 
(Walker et al., 2002). 
Sometimes, environmental changes (both deregulatory and technological changes) have 
been initiated by policy makers in the US telecom industry. For incumbents, they develop their 
own routines of strategic action behaviors to cope with such environmental changes. Nelson & 
Winter (1982) argued that routines were made up of the conscious and tacit knowledge and skills 
held by firms who carried out certain types of strategic activities more frequently. Levinthal & 
March (1993) also argued that a firm’s actions tended to be gradually rigid, narrow, and simple 
owing to the repeated use of their knowledge bases. Once the firm’s choice of strategic actions 
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achieves success, their tendency is to continue to exploit their existing strategies that have 
worked in the past (Audia et al., 2000; Miller, 1994; Miller & Chen, 1994). 
In other words, organizational inertia (Hannan & Freeman, 1984) forces a firm to be less 
motivated to compete aggressively. This leads a firm to be inattentive to the intelligence 
gathering and information processing activities (Miller, 1994). Typically, the firm’s 
embeddedness in its institutional context is a basic reason for a firm’s resistance to change 
(Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). Thus, the more firms are coupled to a prevailing organizational 
template in a highly structured institutional context, the higher their resistance to change 
(Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). However, their persistent and repetitive use of certain strategic 
action type(s) can be hampered when external conditions are changed to require alternative 
responses, a phenomenon known as a competency trap (Levitt & March, 1988). Organizational 
inertia may lead to self-destruction in not acquiring organizational legitimacy when major shifts 
in competitive, technological, social, and legal conditions impose the need to use new strategic 
actions in a timely manner (Audia et al., 2000; Reuf, 1997). 
Oliver (1997) argued that a firm’s sustainable advantage depended on the ability to 
manage the institutional context of its resource decisions. To survive, a firm must be able to 
reproduce and modify its routines in the face of industry evolution (Nelson & Winter, 1982). A 
firm may respond strategically, either by decoupling its structures from its operations or by 
seeking to defend itself from the institutional (or technological) pressures it has experienced 
(Scott, 2001). The central idea of neoinstitutionalism (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) is that an 
organization tends to conform to norms and cultural codes in an industry to gain legitimacy and, 
thus, to improve its performance or survival rates (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 
1977). As environmental changes occur, new sets of institutional legitimacy and competencies 
 12 
need to be identified by firms. Greve (1995) found that mimetic isomorphism was stronger 
among similarly-sized firms as large firms tended to copy the strategic actions of other large 
firms in a population of savings and loan associations. When “structurally equivalent” firms such 
as the RBOCs in the telecom industry undertake similar actions, they became increasingly 
institutionalized (Burt, 1987). 
For a firm’s efforts to be aligned with industry norms, isomorphism (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983) emphasizes the role of the firm’s mimetic behavior in explaining patterns of 
strategic actions among industry players. Haveman (1993) also suggested that members of an 
industry group would tend to imitate, either consciously or unconsciously, the actions of the 
largest or most profitable firms in that group (Webb & Pettigrew, 1999). Zuckerman (1999) 
demonstrated that the failure to acquire social legitimacy imposed an economic penalty on 
organizations in a financial market (Kim et al., 2006). 
The RBOCs, that all have inherited AT&T’s administrative heritage, are envisaged 
adopting or abandoning particular initiatives that are then consciously or unconsciously copied 
by others (Abrahamson, 1991; Haveman, 1993; Greve, 1995). When new environmental changes 
are introduced, they copy each other’s strategic actions so that they acquire institutional 
legitimacy and new competencies in a changing environment (Baum & Oliver, 1991). Even 
strategic abandonment decisions are contagious, causing managers to examine what others do in 
the market for clues to pinpoint more environmentally aligned strategic actions, since the future 
performance of current and alternative strategies can be highly uncertain (Greve, 1995). While a 
firm’s actions are copied by others, even casual observation indicates the RBOCs’ strategic 
action patterns show interesting differences. Ambiguity in actions (or different sets of action 
portfolios in this study), similar to resource ambiguity (Barney, 1991), makes it difficult for a 
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firm to figure out which actions (or action portfolios) to copy. Despite a known recipe for 
success and a decision to pursue it, a firm may be unable to implement any necessary strategies 
on time because organizational culture can be highly inertial, even in the midst of environmental 
changes (Harrison & Carroll, 1991). 
Based on the extensive literature discussed above, we may argue that firms adapt their 
strategic actions in response to environmental changes, and successful firms proactively adapt 
and frequently redefine their strategic actions in order to maintain their environmental alignment 
(Venkatraman & Prescott, 1990). I will now discuss some specific aspects of a firm’s strategic 
action responses to deregulatory and technological changes. 
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3.0  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This section extends the theoretical framework addressed by prior research by studying corporate 
strategic action portfolios, and how they affect a firm’s performance. To accomplish this 
purpose, I first examine the relationships between individual strategic actions and environmental 
changes. Next, this study focuses on three key corporate strategic actions as strategic action 
portfolios and their relationships to firm performance. 
3.1 STRATEGIC ACTIONS AND DEREGULATORY (TECHNOLOGICAL) 
CHANGES 
Deregulation refers to the relaxation of governmental controls that govern a firm’s 
strategic behavior. Deregulatory changes establish the ground rules of competition and create 
varieties of market behavior (Dobbin & Dowd, 1997). For instance, changes in antitrust law and 
enforcement at the turn of the century changed both the volume and reasons for acquisition 
actions in the early railroad foundings in Massachusetts between 1825 and 1922 (Dobbin & 
Dowd, 1997). Smith & Grimm (1987) also looked at the profound shift in the strategies of 
railroads following deregulation. 
In a regulated environment, a regulatory agency controls the scale and scope of a firm’s 
utilization of resources and capacity (Smith & Grimm, 1987). Another focus has been on the 
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deregulatory effects on competitive decisions such as prices, production costs, innovation, and 
productivity (Wholey & Sanchez, 1991). In particular, deregulation eliminates the market 
sharing arrangements established in the earlier regime. Utilization of excess capacity becomes 
more relevant when a firm experiences a transition in deregulation (Pettus, 2001). Thus, a firm is 
forced to explore alternative strategies in order to maintain congruence with deregulatory 
changes (Kashlak & Joshi, 1994; Walker et al., 2002). 
Prior studies looked at different dimensions of a firm’s strategic actions in adapting to 
deregulatory changes. Deregulatory changes influence the firm’s entry and exit from a market 
(Wholey & Sanchez, 1991). Haveman (1993) found that savings and loans expanded extensively 
into new domains after they were allowed to compete in the fields previously closed to them. 
Walker et al. (2002) also found that new technological and competitive forms had emerged in the 
airline industry following institutional change that facilitated entry. 
Along with deregulatory changes, technological changes are another dimension of 
environmental change firms should consider. Dowling et al. (1994) examined how technological 
changes had affected an industry’s structure. Technological changes establish the ground rules of 
competition and create alternative market behavior (Henderson, 1993). New technology triggers 
firms to consider strategic action changes (Christensen, 1997). For example, the main sources of 
growth among the surviving RBOCs is no longer their traditional fixed-line telephone services; 
rather newer services like wireless and the high-speed broadband services are beginning to 
constitute a major share of a firm’s revenue. 
The fast growing diffusions of the above services have created a more intense 
competitive environment. In response to such changes, many firms have internally invested into 
the new generations of digital wireless networks, and have deployed thousand miles of fiber-
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optic infrastructure around the world. Also, a significant number of firms have made a series of 
strategic alliances and engaged in significant merger and acquisition activities in order to be 
technologically innovative in the era of technological convergence. All of these examples 
illustrate the technological challenges in the industry as well as the actions that a firm needs to 
consider to be effectively competitive in the face of such challenges. The convergence of 
technologies brought a wide range of firms into direct competition as well as simultaneous 
collaboration with one another. 
3.2 STRATEGIC ACTIONS TO STRATEGIC PORTFOLIOS 
This study extends previous research of strategic actions to strategic action portfolios. In the 
competitive dynamics literature, competitive actions are defined as broader sets of externally 
directed, specific and observable competitive moves initiated by firms to improve or defend their 
relative competitive positions (Chen & Hambrick, 1995; Chen & MacMillan, 1992; Ferrier et al., 
1999; Grimm & Smith, 1997; Smith et al., 1992). In contrast, this study focuses on three key 
corporate strategic actions as strategic action portfolios. 
Corporate strategic actions are considered to reflect a firm’s commitment (Ghemawat, 
1991) or abandonment of resources in adapting to environmental changes. As environmental 
changes occur, a firm tries to choose the right mix of different strategic actions (i.e. strategic 
action portfolios) in order to achieve the best environmental fit (Pettus, 2001). A firm is not only 
exploiting its existing resources to maintain its market dominance but also exploring other types 
of resources outside its firm’s boundaries for sustainable competitive advantages (March, 1991). 
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In this study, a firm’s critical resource advantage will be reflected in the ways it builds, 
integrates, and reconfigures its corporate strategic action portfolios. 
In the event of environmental changes, a firm may consider various types of strategic 
actions to expand or shrink its strategic boundaries. As deregulation eliminates the market 
sharing arrangements established in the earlier regime, a firm should explore alternative strategic 
actions to overcome such changes (Madsen & Walker, 2001). Regulators have typically been 
viewed M&A actions as anti-competitive practices in concentrated industries, and they have 
reluctantly approved M&A actions earlier among industry participants, in particular for the 
RBOCs. As a result, a firm’s choice of corporate strategic actions tends to be limited to certain 
types of actions, such as strategic alliance actions, looking for areas where regulatory oversights 
are less restrictive in the global setting. 
At the same time, technological changes may force a firm to acquire newly created assets 
or divest some of its existing assets so that it can be associated with technologically advanced 
resources. As a firm expands its strategic boundaries at all directions, a successful firm will be 
the one that adapts and redefines strategic action portfolios in order to maintain its environmental 
alignment (Venkatraman & Prescott, 1990). 
Among corporate strategic actions that are focused in this study, strategic alliance actions 
have been one of the most frequently researched sources of competitive advantages in strategic 
management literature (Ireland et al., 2002). Deregulatory changes will influence the size and 
patterns of strategic alliance actions. Powell (1990) argued that institutional arrangements were 
critical in explaining the formation of alliances. Previous research also focused on the formation 
of strategic alliances using past relationships among partners (Gulati, 1995), and technological 
and geographical proximity among partners (Stuart, 1998). 
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In the competitive dynamics literature, strategic alliance actions are viewed as 
competitive responses to prevent others from gaining a competitive edge (Madhavan et al., 2004; 
Silverman & Baum, 2002; Garcia-Pont & Nohira, 2002; Park & Zhou, 2005). Strategic alliances 
also help firms to gain market power and additional access to complementary resources (Kogut, 
1988). A firm with limited resource availability prefers strategic alliance actions to other actions. 
Madhavan et al. (1998) found that inter-firm relationship networks could be viewed as 
strategic resources which were subject to change as the industry itself changed. Thus, different 
alliance patterns and different levels of alliance intensity can be good indicators of how operators 
are shaping their network positions in the fast-changing marketplace in search of market share 
and profitability (Madhavan et al., 1998). A firm is likely to differ in both competitive activity 
and competitive variety because of differences in alliance-based resource advantages (Gnyawali 
et al., 2001). 
While strategic alliance activities are more frequently and easily used in response to 
environmental changes, the critical impacts of M&A activities in the US telecom service industry 
have been significant over last twenty years. In particular, the seven RBOCs’ mega M&A deals 
have reshaped industry structure, and ultimately led to the seven RBOCs’ different survival and 
failure stories since the AT&T divestiture in 1984. Typically, M&A actions are primarily 
motivated by the prospect of scale economies in the consolidated firms. In particular, horizontal 
acquisitions, which have been common in the US telecom industry, are considered to achieve 
productive efficiency through strategic reconfiguration (Capron & Mitchell, 1998). 
While it is important to consider different corporate strategic actions individually, it is 
also worthwhile to look at both M&A and alliance actions as a whole. When a firm considers 
different strategic actions, its decisions are based upon its mix of different strategic actions rather 
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than considering a single individual strategic action at one time. Ultimately, a firm’s 
performance should be measured by the whole reconfiguration of strategic actions or strategic 
action portfolios. 
While both strategic alliance and M&A actions are extensively studied, divestiture 
actions have mostly been treated as side aspects or mirror images of even broader phenomena 
such as corporate restructuring or M&A actions (Brauer, 2006). For instance, prior studies 
considered make or buy choices in determining a firm’s boundaries, but have not considered 
extending their boundaries to include divestiture actions. In fact, shareholder wealth gain on 
divestiture actions is reported as significant stock price increases on the announcement of a spin-
off or sell-off (Buckley, 1991). It should be noted that a firm’s strategic decisions to divest 
certain businesses or assets are often times considered simultaneously with other types of 
corporate strategic actions (Villalonga & McGahan, 2005). 
For internal development actions, a firm’s boundary expanding activities are often times 
initiated from its internally developed corporate ventures. While the large sum of a firm’s 
internal capital expenditures are devoted to look for its growth, prior studies have not overlooked 
the importance of internal development actions together with other corporate strategic actions. 
The appendix section in this study will further analyze the effects of a firm’s internal 
development actions. 
Considering strategic actions in combination as portfolios has meaningful implications 
both for managers and policy makers. In particular, when a firm competes against other firms in 
the multiple layers of industry’s value network (Stabell et al., 1998), different strategic actions 
should be concurrently considered because environmental changes force a firm to evaluate and 
reconfigure different strategic action types at the same time. For instance, certain types of 
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strategic actions may be restricted or allowed only to some extent when environmental changes 
occur. 
The experiences gained in one strategic action often inhibit learning in another. The 
myopia of learning viewpoint (Levinthal & March, 1993) highlights the hazards of increasing 
specialization in a particular knowledge domain (Zollo & Reuer, 2001). On the other hand, 
absorptive capacity arguments (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) suggest that a firm having developed 
superior knowledge in a specific area is more capable of expanding the span of its competence 
into the related domains, and this allows for the existence of positive learning externalities across 
firm’s strategic actions (Zollo & Reuer, 2001). Prior research on corporate strategic actions has 
not explicitly examined different strategic actions that are embedded within accepted industry 
practices or as a function of the deregulatory or technological environments. Research on 
corporate strategic action portfolios will provide a more holistic view on a firm’s strategic 
behavior and its efforts to sustain a competitive advantage. 
3.3 STRATEGIC ACTION PORTFOLIOS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
Each of corporate strategic actions examined in this study has significant implications for a 
firm’s strategic success and its sustainable competitive advantage. After establishing the 
relationship between strategic action portfolios and environmental changes, this section analyzes 
how a firm’s strategic action portfolios are related to firm performance. A firm’s well-balanced 
and timely staged combinations of strategic actions in a tightly-fitted business environment are 
key characteristics for sustainable performance (Ferrier et al., 1999). 
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Prior studies tested how individual action was related to a firm’s performance. Siggelkow 
(2001) presented how tight fit among firm’s actions affected the firm’s ability to react to 
environmental changes. Various action dimensions of overall action level (frequency), diversity 
of the types of actions (variety), and the degree of departure from industry norms 
(nonconformity) have been explored as key empirical indicators to measure the relationship 
between firm-level actions and profitability (Miller & Chen, 1996; Chen & McMillan, 1992; 
Ferrier et al., 1999; Grimm & Smith, 1997; Lee et al., 2000). 
Competitive strategic actions are shaped by the sequence and speed of multiple actions. 
Ferrier (2001) characterized a firm’s sequence of competitive actions to account for differences 
in their relative performance8
                                                 
8 His findings suggested that a firms’ sequence of competitive actions (measured as attack volume, attack duration, 
attack complexity, and attack unpredictability) was influenced by TMT heterogeneity, past performance, slack, and 
three industry characteristics (entry barrier, concentration, and industry growth) 
 
. Studies on timing of entry actions have attempted to determine the 
advantages that early entrants are able to develop and hold over subsequent entrants, and further 
examine the differences in the ability of late movers to penetrate into the market (Shamsie et al., 
2004). The timing and order of first movers’ actions (Porter, 1980) capture the largest portion of 
the initial sales volume in the growing market, but their sales growth and market share will be at 
risk if not equipped with timely subsequent strategic actions and responses. Hopkins (2003) 
examined the question of whether it was better to respond quickly with individual competitive 
responses or wait until a broad strategic reorientation could be possible. His result suggested that 
the US firms that had a slower but more concentrated and aggressive response lost less market 
share than firms that responded quickly (Hopkins, 2003). Chen et al. (1995) also found that 
smaller airlines more actively initiated competitive challenges and were speedy but low-key, 
even secretive, in executing their competitive actions. 
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The competitive dynamics literature has extended the analysis of a firm’s individual 
action characteristics to the conceptualization of strategic action repertoires (Miller & Chen, 
1996). Past organizational performance leads to strategic persistence, or organizational inertia 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1984) – a tendency for a firm to stick with the existing strategic actions that 
had worked in the past (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Miller & Chen, 1994). Organizational inertia 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1984) has a positive association with firm performance during the early 
stage of organizational development, but can be detrimental to firm performance as organizations 
grow and mature in a dynamic environment (Lumpkin & Dess, 1995; Miller & Shamsie, 2001). 
Audia et al. (2000) also looked at the US airline and trucking industries, and found that success 
increased strategic persistence in the face of dramatic environmental changes and that this 
persistence would have negative revenue-based efficiency measure of performance compared to 
firms with lesser histories of success. 
RBV proponents have argued that simplified repertoires give a firm a competitive edge 
by focusing its attention and efforts on developing unique, hard to copy skills and resources that 
could be beneficial both in creating a competitive advantage and in building valuable and rare 
resources in different industries (Miller et al., 1996; Miller & Chen, 1996). On the other hand, 
changing market conditions make a firm’s existing resources obsolete, making it subject to 
market share erosion (Ferrier et al., 1999). Thus, factors such as competence-destroying 
technologies (Tushman & Anderson, 1986) or structure-loosening events (Madhavan et al., 
1998) increase environmental uncertainty by destroying the existing competitive bases in the 
industry (Koka et al., 2006). 
Strategic action portfolios can be understood as steps with which managers build, 
integrate, and reconfigure a firm’s resources and dynamic managerial capabilities (Adner & 
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Helfat, 2003). Thus, strategic action portfolios change the firm’s range of product offerings and 
their service locations, and ultimately lead to the firm’s long term sustainability. When firms 
successfully navigate strategic action portfolios in response to deregulatory (technological) 
changes, they not only manage environmental risks better but also shape their industries and 
create their own potential opportunities. Successful firms have been the ones that effectively 
redefine industry boundaries and use resources for continual growth (McGee et al., 1995). 
In the scale-based economies like telecom services, incumbents tend to have a 
competitive advantage over new entrants because they have larger pools of managerial talent and 
physical resources to draw from (Gentry, 2004). In other words, a firm with more frequent and 
more diverse strategic activity portfolios will enjoy better profitability. As the environment 
becomes more complex and unpredictable, some firms will find them difficult to develop 
sufficient resources or unable to replicate the successful player’s diverse resource pools quickly 
to meet the market demand (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). As elaborated in this section, prior 
studies report interesting interactions between a firm’s strategic actions and performance in 
response to environmental changes such as deregulatory or technological changes. The following 
section looks at how these relationships have evolved in the US telecom service industry. 
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4.0  THE EVOLUTION OF THE US TELECOM INDUSTRY 
This study covers the US telecom industry from 1984 to 2004. During this period a series of key 
regulatory reforms and technological innovations took place. While various types of competitive 
dynamics arguments are discussed in many other industries like the US airline industry (Miller & 
Chen, 1996) and the global steel industry (Hopkins, 2003; Gnyawali et al., 2006), the complexity 
and the evolving nature of the US telecom industry structure provides an additional interesting 
research setting to extend the existing literature in strategy (Chen, 1996; Ferrier et al., 1999). 
In particular, this study focuses on the increasing number of RBOCs’ strategic actions as 
they have encountered deregulatory and technological shifts from a naturally-monopolistic 
environment to a deregulated and more competitive environment. This section first briefly looks 
at the evolution of the US telecom industry from 1984 AT&T’s divestiture, and then details the 
Telecom Act 1996, outlining how these deregulatory changes have influenced the RBOCs’ 
corporate strategic actions. Also, it discusses the increasing acceptance of wireless telecom 
services as a key technological change in the telecom industry. 
From the beginning of the telecom industry in 18799
                                                 
9 Bell invented telephony in 1879 
 to 1984, AT&T enjoyed a dominant 
market position in the US telecom industry, regionally comprising 22 Bell Operating Companies 
(BOCs). In 1984, AT&T was broken into one long-distance company, the reconstituted AT&T, 
and seven regional bell operating companies (RBOCs) providing local services. GTE was the 
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only other independent telephone operator with a comparable size against these RBOCs. 
Subsequently, the long-distance and international markets had been liberalized (Dawson et al., 
2006). Long distance competition was initiated by MCI and Sprint, and became the main new 
entrants. While there was some competition in the long distance service market, it was limited by 
the regulatory restrictions on the number of new entrants and the absence of regulations requiring 
the incumbents to open their networks to be interconnected by new entrants at cost-based 
wholesale prices. In general, local access and local telephone services remained naturally 
monopolized by the incumbents (Fransman, 2001). 
The decade from the mid-1980s was marked by an explosion in demand for new telecom 
products and services. The rapid growth in markets, the improvement of existing technologies 
and the emergence of new substitutes helped to fuel new entry and intensified competition in the 
industry. As previously mentioned, the seven RBOCs with the similar structure and services 
have shared with old AT&T’s institutional legacy and administrative heritage, but over the next 
15-year period, their strategic actions adapted to different structures and tried to pursue different 
product and service markets (Williams & Mitchell, 2004). The function of newly created RBOCs 
in 1984 was to maintain the local network and to provide access to those network facilities to 
AT&T, and its competitors, and the growing number of information service providers (Sterling, 
et al., 2006). It should be noted that the seven RBOCs were still prohibited to serve any inter-
LATA10
The whole process of breaking up a century-old organization of AT&T was not easy, and 
the actual divestiture process went through a lengthy legal debates and approvals for several 
 long distance telecom services while they maintained their market dominance in the 
local telephone services. 
                                                 
10 LATA (Local Access Tranport Area) defines that area in which RBOCs can provide their services. Each LATA 
may include more than one area code 
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years before the Justice Department finalized it in 1984. Obviously, the seven RBOCs were the 
key outcomes of AT&T divestiture in 1984, therefore, they couldn’t proactively respond to the 
environmental changes at this time. However, the new post-divestiture environment became 
more complicated. For instance, those that had formerly slugged it out as adversaries now joined 
forces while former allies turned into vigorous competitors (Sterling, et al., 2006, p179). For the 
seven RBOCs, they began to look for ways to change and expand their market presence beyond 
their restricted local telephone services. Later, as the deregulatory process of amending 1934 
Telecom Act became apparent in the mid-1990’s, the seven RBOCs took their strategic positions 
rather proactively responding to regulatory change then. One purpose of this study is to compare 
with their strategic activities around these deregulatory changes. 
As competition became more intense in the US telecom industry, more frequent and 
diverse corporate strategic activities were sought after among the seven RBOCs in search for 
new business ventures. For example, less than a month after the MFJ11
In 1995, AT&T went through the second breakup, called “trivestiture” - AT&T divided 
into three independent parts of very different sizes – AT&T, telecom service providers of long 
distance, wireless, and online services. Network Systems later became Lucent Technologies. 
And Global Information Systems, formerly NCR, began making bank and business computer 
’s implementation in 
1984, Bell Atlantic filed a petition to enter the equipment leasing market. Bell South also filed a 
motion to provide certain software programs and related services. Pacific Telesis field for 
permission to enter into foreign business ventures. In early 1990s, AT&T took over NCR, a 
strategic move into the computer equipment business, and then acquired McCaw Cellular, one of 
the major wireless service providers.  
                                                 
11 MFJ (Modification of Final Judgment, also known as Divestiture Degree) 
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systems (Sterling et al., 2006, p179~187). It is worthwhile to look at AT&T’s second divestiture 
in more detail. In particular, Lucent Technologies was officially separated from the control of 
AT&T for the first time, which then could be dated back to the era of Bell Labs. AT&T’s Bell 
Labs led almost the majority of technological changes in the field. From then on, RBOCs’ 
responses to technological changes needed to be modified because they no longer enjoyed a 
favorable first-mover advantage to technological changes in the US Telecom industry. 
As other countries followed the privatization and liberalization in their telecom service 
sector, a series of cross-border M&As, strategic alliances and foreign investments flooded the 
international telecommunications market. The seven RBOCs played an important role in all of 
these strategic activities.  Since the RBOCs were heavily regulated in the US, they looked for 
business growth outside the US telecom market. Many RBOCs invested into the global joint 
ventures with foreign telecom providers (Smith & Zeithaml, 1996). In many instances, foreign 
governments turned to the seven RBOCs and other investors for the monetary resources and the 
technological expertise in developing the telecom network infrastructure (Sterling, et al., 2006). 
Along with the seven RBOCs, foreign telecom operators such as NTT (Nippon Telephone & 
Telegraph), BT (British Telecom), DT(Deutsch Telecom), and FT (France Telecom) began to 
expand their global presence and became “new entrants’ in each other’s national markets by 
establishing global strategic alliances aimed at providing multinational firms with end-to-end 
telecom services. 
In many countries, 100% FDI wasn’t allowed in the area of telecommunication services, 
therefore, only a few strategic options such as international joint ventures (IJVs) were preferred 
by the seven RBOCs. IJVs provided the seven RBOCs with investment opportunities and with 
opportunities to gain experience in markets that were closed to them in the US (Sterling, et al., 
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2006).  Later in the 1990s’, the seven RBOCs undertook a series of corporate strategic moves to 
expand their geographical coverage domestically, and moved into the new services such as 
CATV and wireless services. 
The structure of the industry has changed once again with the amendment of 
Telecommunication Act in 1996 that permitted long-distance carriers to move into local markets, 
and local carriers to move into long-distance markets (Dawson et al., 2006). The 1934 Telecom 
Act was amended in 1996 with the intention of introducing competition at the regional and local 
levels. The Telecom Act 1996 contained specific sections (Section 25112 and Section 27113) that 
promoted widespread entry of new entrants into the local exchange market as well as the 
RBOCs’ reentry into the inter-LATA14
Also, the RBOCs actively began to participate in the rounds of FCC’s wireless spectrum 
auctions and tried to expand their dominant positions in the wireless market. Despite the FCC’s 
hope to promote more local competition, the Telecom Act 1996 provided the RBOCs with 
 markets. The Telecom Act 1996 removed legal and 
regulatory barriers that traditionally have proscribed entry into Incumbent Local Exchange 
Carriers (ILECs) franchised territories, and imposed a set of resale, unbundling, and 
interconnection obligations on ILECs that enabled new entrants to efficiently utilize the existing 
local exchange networks in order for providing competing retail services to end users (Beard et 
al., 1998). 
                                                 
12 Section 251 covered general duty of telecom carriers and specific obligations of all local exchange carriers on 
interconnection among carriers. Even though facility-based competition was preferred to resale-based competition in 
the local exchange segment, the 1996 Telecom Act chose the policy direction of the resale-based market entry and 
the unbundled access in order to promote faster and broader competitive environment in the local segment. It was 
argued, at least initially, to be difficult for new entrants deploying sustainable amount of telecom infrastructure to 
compete against used-to-be dominant incumbents 
13 In return for RBOCs’ opening up with local exchange services, Section 271 relieved RBOCs’ line of business 
restrictions. But RBOCs had to meet competitive checklist of 14 pro-competitive conditions in order to be 
authorized to offer in-region interLATA services. Section 271 began to take the opposite direction from the 1984 
AT&T divestiture when RBOCs were prohibited from offering interLATA services 
14 LATA stands for Local Access and Transport Area 
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strategic opportunities to maintain their dominance by reconfiguring their series of strategic 
actions. Even though most RBOCs’ corporate strategic actions still required both federal- and 
state-level regulatory oversight, they were able to formulate more frequent and various strategic 
actions.  
Along with deregulatory processes, technological advancement and service convergence 
stimulated the competitive market structure by forcing firms to compete with new services and 
technologies in vertically integrated upstream and downstream markets (Ware, 1998). Wireless 
technology had been continually upgraded with transmission quality and traffic volume capacity. 
Fast deployment of Internet infrastructure transformed communication networks with better data 
transmission capabilities and the multimedia functions at much low costs compared to those of 
the fixed line telephone networks. 
In 2004, the US market was dominated by the ‘big six’ national wireless operators: 
Verizon Wireless, Cingular Wireless, AT&T Wireless, Sprint PCS, Nextel and T-Mobile. The 
merger and acquisition activities in the market have changed market dynamics (Dawson et al., 
2006). With the acquisition of AT&T Wireless by Cingular (renamed as AT&T Mobility later) in 
November 2005, and the merger of Sprint and Nextel in August 2005, the market now has four 
main operators. A combined market share of over 80% of the US wireless subscribers allows 
these operators to share the advantages of national coverage, long-term operating experience, a 
large embedded network and customer support infrastructure (Dawson et al., 2006). Some 
operators have also benefited from ties to fixed-line parent companies. 
From the standpoint of telecom operators’ making strategic decisions, The Telecom Act 
1996 triggered telecom operators to consider various options of strategic actions. It became 
possible for the RBOCs to extend their telecom services beyond their traditional local telephone 
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segments. The RBOCs were authorized to offer long distance inter-LATA telecommunications 
services originating in a state where it provided local services once certain conditions had been 
met to open the RBOCs’ local markets in that state to competition (Schwartz, 2000). Allowing 
the RBOCs to offer long-distance services was intended to achieve the 1996 Telecom Act’s 
competitive goals rapidly. Telecom operators adjusted their strategic actions in order to be 
adaptive to environmental changes (Koski & Majumdar, 2002; Noda & Collis, 2001; Smith & 
Zeithaml, 1996). As a result, a series of mega M&A actions among the RBOCs began to emerge 
in the marketplace. Alliance and other types of corporate strategic actions were frequently 
considered by the RBOCs. Also, the RBOCs sought after organizational transformation through 
corporate strategic actions by extending their business scope and geographical coverage 
significantly. Joshi et al. (1998) used Miles & Snow (1978)’s four typology to illustrate the 
patterns of the US telecom operators’ strategic alliance actions15
In mid-2006, several major wire-line & wireless telecommunications providers are 
worthwhile to look at in detail. AT&T, as the result of the merger between long-distance 
company AT&T and SBC (which was itself the result of the merger of several companies – 
. Smith & Zeithaml (1996) also 
showed the analysis of the RBOCs’ deploying capabilities that had acquired from international 
activities subsequently created the strategic flexibility into their strategic actions for the domestic 
businesses. Noda & Collis (2001) also looked at the evolution of intra-industry firm 
heterogeneity on the development of cellular telephone services among the RBOCs. 
                                                 
15 A firm took initiatives for changes (Prospectors). By doing that, a firm took advantage of first-mover advantages 
and led the market trends as it wished to be depending on its resource availability. On the other hand, a firm 
attempted to locate and maintain a secure niche (Defenders). Also, a firm reacted to the actions taken by 
competitors, a passive way of dealing with changes (Reactors). Lastly, a firm waited and anticipated how market 
would be shaped in the future (Analyzers) 
 
 31 
Pacific Telesis, Ameritech, SNET and Southwestern Bell) became the largest telecom service 
providers in the US. 
Next, Verizon, as the result of the merger between long-distance company MCI and 
Verizon (which was itself the product of the mergers among Bell Atlantic, Nynex and GTE) 
followed AT&T’s strategic expansion. However, Verizon’s strategic path to the current size went 
through quite different strategic action portfolios over the last 20 year period. 
BellSouth was the only remaining incumbent local exchange provider serving the south-
eastern US regions from the 1984 AT&T break-up. Although AT&T acquired BellSouth later in 
2006, BellSouth managed to keep its own strategic presence but experienced some difficulties in 
developing its competitive strategic positioning between new AT&T and Verizon. 
Qwest, out of the US West that was one of the original ILECs in the western US, also 
struggled with positioning itself as a niche player in the Internet backbone and international 
telecom services. Among other long-distance carriers, Sprint, the wire-line arm of the combined 
wire-line and wireless operators was still a major provider of services to business customers. The 
mergers that had formed these companies have blurred the traditional lines between ILECs and 
inter-exchange carriers (IXCs or long-distance operators), and therefore made the regulatory 
environment more complex (Dawson et al., 2006). 
In this section, I looked at some of recent deregulatory and technological changes in the 
US telecom industry. Regulatory reform and technological innovations began to transform the 
telecom industry structure, stabilizing the number of the surviving players (e.g. RBOCs) with an 
influx of new niche players (e.g. CLECs). The growing expansion of market boundaries has been 
also observed throughout the last 20-year period. All of the changes promoted more competition 
by eliminating the entry barriers into the markets. However, some surviving players (in particular 
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for RBOCs) have been successful in maintaining their market dominance even after the 
deregulatory and technological changes took place in the turbulent environment. One of the 
reasons we’ve witnessed different performance heterogeneity among the RBOCs can be 
explained as their unique ability to combine strategic actions, or strategic action portfolios, to 
cope with environmental changes, as hypothesized below. 
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5.0  HYPOTHESES 
In this study, two main research questions are hypothesized and tested. First, I look at how a 
firm’s corporate strategic action portfolios relate to both deregulatory and technological changes. 
Hypotheses 1 through 4 test how a firm reconfigures its corporate strategic action 
portfolios in response to deregulatory and technological changes. In particular, two attributes - 
frequency and variety – in firm’s strategic action portfolios will be discussed. 
Hypotheses 5 and 6 focus on the different nature of a firm’s strategic response 
positioning to deregulatory and technological changes. Lengthy deregulatory processes (Kim & 
Prescott, 2005) and a firm’s strong ties to institutional building (Butler & Carney, 1986) enable 
firms to identify key issues and to overcome potential competitive risks in response to 
deregulatory changes. Ultimately, firms in particular for incumbents, will try to turn deregulatory 
changes to their advantages (Bailey, 1997). For instance, proactively-responding firms in the 
process of international expansion gain substantial first-mover advantages due to the transient 
nature of the windows of market opportunity and lengthy regulatory approval processes (Sarkar 
et al., 1999). 
On the other hand, technological changes are difficult to predict and often times radical in 
nature, and incumbents have a tendency to limit a number of strategic actions they consider for 
technological changes in advance. Incumbents’ prior commitment (Ghemawat, 1991) to the 
existing technologies may also delay a firm’s speedy response to the technological changes. 
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Therefore, a firm takes a reactive strategic action positioning in response to technological 
changes. 
Hypotheses 7 and 8 look at how a firm’s corporate strategic action portfolios affect its 
performance. Walker et al. (2002) reported that the variation in performance among incumbents 
didn’t significantly change when deregulation occurred even though the range of services and 
process innovations were initiated in the deregulated US airline industry. However, they 
questioned how incumbents leveraged their practices in response to institutional changes 
(Walker et al., 2002). This study looks at the frequency and variety of corporate strategic action 
portfolios to see if they will determine the performance heterogeneity among the RBOCs in the 
US telecom industry. 
5.1 FREQUENCY OF CORPORATE STRATEGIC ACTION PORTFOLIOS AND 
DEREGULATORY CHANGES 
Frequency of a firm’s strategic actions is one of the mostly studied properties in the competitive 
dynamics literature. Frequency of action portfolios is the total number of a firm’s corporate 
strategic actions in a given year (Miller & Chen, 1996; Gnyawali et al., 2006). Most prior studies 
measured this construct by the counts of a firm’s individual strategic actions. 
This study follows the same approaches. While a firm‘s total counts of strategic action 
are good measures for the frequency analysis, they may provide us biased results when 
simultaneously analyzing the multiple strategic actions with different magnitude. For example, 
M&A and divestiture actions require a firm’s strong commitment with significant financial 
 35 
resources being considered when compared to strategic alliance and joint venture actions. 
Therefore, this study measures the frequency of a firm’s strategic actions in dollar amount. 
While prior studies look at various types of actions individually, this study’s strategic 
actions look at portfolios of a few important strategic actions. They are merger and acquisitions, 
strategic alliances and divestitures. In addition, a firm’s internal development actions are also 
considered separately in the Appendix section. Although it is worthwhile to look at the extensive 
range of firm’s strategic actions, this study focuses on the key corporate strategic actions as 
corporate strategic action portfolios that will provide us more meaningful assessment of a firm’s 
actions and performance.  
Deregulatory changes provide the framework for a firm’s strategic behavior. In return, a 
firm actively constructs strategic (re)actions to each deregulatory policy shift. As to deregulatory 
policy shifts, a firm constructs a different set of strategy as optimal, and others often times copy 
and refine what leading firms have constructed in response to policy changes (Dobbin & Dowd, 
1997). As competition intensifies in a deregulated environment, a firm’s choices of available 
strategic actions tend to increase in adapting to deregulatory changes. A firm can take more 
alternative strategic actions when regulatory constraints are lifted. Deregulatory changes provide 
a firm with the flexibility to take different actions. As deregulatory changes occur, institutional 
norms are changing – a firm is taking more number of actions to be aligned with the changed 
industry norm. 
For example, prior to the 1996 Telecom Act, a firm’s allowable actions were strictly 
limited by regulators (Smith & Zeithaml, 1996). The RBOCs had to look for global strategic 
alliance actions outside the US market where the RBOCs’ strategic flexibility was less restricted 
by the FCC. Global strategic alliance actions were considered to minimize their market share 
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losses caused by new entrants in the US market (Powell, 1990).  Also, deregulations make the 
forming of ties more frequent and attractive, as in the case of the steel industry when antitrust 
regulations were relaxed in 1984 to facilitate research ventures between domestic partners 
(Madhavan et al., 1998). 
As mentioned in the previous section, institutional theory explains why firms within a 
population exhibit similar (i.e. isomorphism) and stable (i.e. routines) action characteristics. 
Isomorphic behavior (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) is a constraining process that forces one firm 
to resemble others when both face the same set of environmental conditions. When competitors 
took similar actions, there were little chances that any single firm would be significantly 
successful or failing relative to others, thus, imitating others’ strategic actions helped to preserve 
the status quo among incumbents even in industries where strong rivalry was maintained 
(Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). Deephouse (1996) showed that isomorphism in the strategies of 
commercial banks was related to organizational legitimacy conferred by bank regulators and the 
media, even in the heterogeneous presence of organizational age, size, and performance. Firms 
adopt more frequent strategic actions, not because they are efficient (per se), but because they 
furnish legitimacy in the eyes of outside stakeholders such as regulators (Deephouse, 1996). 
Furthermore, deregulation energizes the latent potential for segmentation in markets, and 
a firm can use this segmentation to guide the reconfiguration of its resources (Delmas & Russo, 
2005). When deregulatory changes occur, a firm begins to provide more number of services (for 
RBOCs, local services to long distance services and later wireless services) in the multiple 
coverage areas, and more strategic actions are necessary to secure new resource pools. As 
deregulation has unfolded in the telecom industry, so has a range of strategic responses (Delmas 
& Russo, 2005). Delmas & Russo (2006), using the electronic utility industry data, analyzed to 
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what extent deregulation triggered strategic changes to the resource bases of some firms. Their 
arguments were how non-market factors such as policy changes stimulated incumbents to change 
their resource bases (Delmas & Russo, 2006), and ultimately increase the frequency of a firm’s 
strategic actions. 
 
 
H1 All else being equal, frequency of a firm’s strategic actions will increase significantly 
as deregulatory changes occur  
 
 
5.2 FREQUENCY OF CORPORATE STRATEGIC ACTION PORTFOLIOS AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES 
A firm will explore more number of strategic actions when technological changes occur. When 
an organization faces high market uncertainty and needs to catch up with new technologies, 
forming new interorganizational network ties with new partners who have technological 
capabilities helps it improve its performance (Nohira & Garcia-Point, 1991). In order to obtain 
new technological resources outside their resource boundaries, a firm will be involved in 
corporate strategic actions such as M&As and JVs, ultimately increasing the number of strategic 
action portfolios. 
Also, a firm tries to upgrade its existing technological infrastructure by considering 
different strategic actions when its strategic positions are at risk. For example, investigating the 
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probability and timing of entry by incumbents into emerging technical subfields of the US 
medical diagnostic imaging industry, Mitchell (1989) argued that firm’s entry probability were 
greatly influenced by strategic actions that focused on technical threats to core products. 
To some extent, a few significant technological breakthroughs have generally been 
pioneered by new entrants (Tushman & Anderson, 1986), and incumbents usually wait and see 
what others do, and try to take rather incremental but more frequent strategic actions to maintain 
their competitive advantages. They will have incentives to take different strategic action paths by 
adopting new technological platforms (or actions) when technological changes are started to be 
recognized as emerging technologies in the marketplace. It can be argued that incumbents would 
like to maintain (or enhance) their pre-existing relationships with the current vendors in order to 
maintain their existing technologies in full use. These long-term relationships will reinforce 
firms to undertake strategic actions reactively when technological changes occur. However, as 
technological changes stimulate the emergence of new services and expand a firm’s prospects to 
vertically integrate and compete in upstream and downstream markets (Ware, 1998), more 
strategic actions will be likely to reconfigure a firm’s strategic alignment (Venkatraman & 
Prescott, 1990) in a more unstable technologically-driven environment. 
 
 
H2 All else being equal, frequency of a firm’s strategic actions will increase significantly 
when technological changes occur 
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5.3 VARIETY OF CORPORATE STRATEGIC ACTION PORTFOLIOS AND 
DEREGULATORY CHANGES 
Deregulatory changes determine which resources a firm should utilize in different institutional 
settings. Regulatory restrictions impose on a firm’s choice of strategic actions. Barney (1991) 
argued that difficulties in a firm’s adaptation to the regulatory changes might be partially 
attributed to the path-dependent nature of a firm’s internal processes and factor-market positions. 
However, in order to compete effectively in the new regime, a firm needs to revise its existing 
capabilities and resources or suffers decreasing performance (Carroll et al., 1988). Also, a firm 
that has developed the ability to learn effectively might be able to adopt routines or behaviors 
that might meet the demands of the new institutional regime, even in the presence of traditional 
resource commitment (Walker et al., 2002). Moreover, Miller & Shamsie (1996) found that 
distinctive resources – property-based vs. knowledge-based resources – contributed to the 
Hollywood studios’ value creation differently as environmental setting had changed from the 
stable and predictable environment to the more uncertain (changing and unpredictable) post-
television environment. 
In general, a firm will not know which type of strategic actions will be a fit to 
deregulatory changes at first. Often times, regulatory constraints for some strategic actions will 
be lifted as deregulatory changes allow more M&A and JV actions. As a result, a firm may be 
involved in executing more divestiture actions in order to take different mix of resources as 
deregulatory changes open up the new business opportunities. Therefore, deregulatory changes 
broaden a firm’s choice of strategic actions in search for their business growth in a changed 
environmental setting. One of the key features of 1996 Telecom Act was to allow the RBOCs to 
broaden their business scope from the fixed-line local telephone to other telecom services, 
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including long distance and international telephone services. For the RBOCs, they had to come 
up with new sets of corporate strategic action portfolios to assess the effectiveness of each 
strategic action in different market segments. 
 
 
H3 All else being equal, variety of a firm’s strategic actions will increase significantly as 
deregulatory changes occur 
 
 
5.4 VARIETY OF CORPORATE STRATEGIC ACTION PORTFOLIOS AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES 
Technological changes also affect the variety of a firm’s strategic actions. Incumbents prefer 
cooperative arrangements over the acquisition of new entrants in order to internalize the new 
technology and thus maximize the value of their real options, particularly in the high uncertainty 
environments (Folta, 1998). Rothaermel (2001) examined the inter-firm cooperative actions 
between incumbents and new entrants, and incumbents used such actions to exploit 
complementary assets from new entrants in adapting to technological changes. 
A firm will not know which type of strategic actions will be a fit to technological 
changes. Also, depending upon the types of technological changes, appropriate strategic actions 
can be considered. For instance, as 3G wireless technology becomes more apparent, a firm has to 
consider variety of strategic actions (e.g. JV and internal development actions) to fasten the 
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introduction of 3G wireless services into the market. For any geographic regions where a firm 
has not licensed to serve, M&A actions can be considered to expand its service coverage. To 
focus more on the wireless segment, a firm will divest non-core businesses as the main 
technological changes shifted from the fixed-lines to the wireless service markets. Miller et al. 
(1996) looked at two different organizational task environments (Castrogiovanni, 2002; Milliken, 
1987). Their finding confirmed that a firm tended to expand its variety of strategic activities in a 
technologically unstable environment (Miller et al. 1996). In order to cope with technological 
changes, a firm is engaged in variety of strategic actions through acquiring or divesting assets, 
developing new markets, and allying its businesses with others16
                                                 
16 AT&T’s divestiture of Lucent Technologies and Cincinnati Bell’s spinning off its data and billing business were 
the recent examples of companies shedding operations which, while perfectly good businesses, are better off 
separate from their formal companies (Berge & Jamison, 1997) 
  
. For example, Ameritech’s 
entry into CATV, SBC’s international investments, and Sprint’s creation of a product for global 
collaboration in multimedia production demonstrated that firms were creating and invading new 
markets through diversifying their strategic action portfolios (Berg & Jamison, 1997). 
 
 
H4 All else being equal, variety of a firm’s strategic actions will increase significantly 
when technological changes occur 
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5.5 PROACTIVE STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO DEREGULATORY CHANGES 
Siggelkow (2001) suggested that environmental changes could be classified with respect to the 
impacts they have on the industry landscape. According to his classification, the effect of 
environmental change on firms can be described as fit-destroying or fit-conserving since 
managers react differently to these two types of changes (Siggelkow, 2001). This study applies 
the similar approach to look at firm’s willingness to take strategic actions in response to 
environmental changes. Forms of deregulation impact on the speed of adaptation in various 
internal governance mechanisms (Kim & Prescott, 2005). Deregulation process in the telecom 
industry takes a long path to be effective, and firms, in particular for incumbents, play important 
roles in shaping the scope of deregulatory changes.  As a result, a firm will be proactively 
involved with strategic actions when deregulatory changes occur, and a firm’s strategic actions 
will be increased even prior to the deregulatory events occur. 
The earlier firms get involved in the process of deregulatory changes, the more strategic 
influences they will have (Bailey, 1997) as firms generate a mix of strategic actions in advance 
to strengthen their capabilities (or maintain their market dominance). With incumbents’ strong 
ties to institutional building (Butler & Carney, 1986), they utilize the opening of policy window, 
a period when incumbents created the strategic use of information to shape a policy path in their 
favor (Bailey, 1997; Owen & Braeutigam, 1978). In other word, incumbents identify the key 
regulatory issues, overcome potential political difficulties by redrafting proposals, and thereby 
turn the politically propitious events to their advantages (Bailey, 1997). 
Depending upon the nature of deregulatory changes, a firm makes its strategic actions 
whether certain deregulatory changes create an incentive to join with competitors (improving 
collective advantages) or to be apart from competitors (improving relative advantages). Thus, a 
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firm sets the stage to what extent deregulatory changes would be unfolded by proactively 
increasing its strategic actions prior to deregulatory changes became effective. For example, a 
firm with discernible market power and leadership positions proactively undertakes a set of 
deterrent actions to achieve a competitive advantage (Grimm & Smith, 1997). Sarkar et al. 
(1999) argued that proactively-responding firms in the process of international expansion gained 
substantial first mover advantages due to the transient nature of the policy windows of market 
opportunity. 
 
 
H5 All else being equal, when deregulatory changes occur, a firm’s strategic actions will 
be more proactive 
 
 
5.6 REACTIVE STARTEGIC RESPONSES TO TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES 
In contrast, a firm has a difficult time predicting how fast technology changes unfold in the 
marketplace. Telecom service firms, in particular large incumbents such as the RBOCs, tend to 
wait and see what types of technologies will be dominating ones in the industry. As a result, a 
firm has limited options of strategic actions it could proactively consider to cope with 
technological changes. A firm’s strategic actions are more reactive to technological changes than 
those to deregulatory changes. For incumbents, prior commitment (Ghemawat, 1991) to the 
existing technologies may also delay their responses because changing or even abandoning the 
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existing resources and technological knowledge bases will receive stronger resistance both 
internally and externally. Unlike new entrants being aggressively innovative to new technologies 
in the marketplace, incumbents tend to be more reactive in shifting their strategic action 
portfolios. 
Innovative technological changes award proactive firms with first mover advantages. 
However, a firm may wait and see what others would respond to technological changes, and 
second mover advantages can be more effective to the uncertain nature of technological changes. 
Since the introduction of wireless telecom services in early 1980s’, wireless technologies have 
undertaken a series of technological evolution from the analogue to the more efficient digital 
networks. Even among digital wireless technologies, different technology standards were 
introduced and upgraded in the market. Since it requires lengthy time and extreme amount of 
resources to deploy any new telecom infrastructure, a firm tends to be more reactive in taking 
strategic actions to upgrade its technologies when technological changes occur. Also, a firm 
takes rather conservative approaches in adapting its strategic actions to newer versions of 
wireless technology standards. 
 
 
H6 All else being equal, when technological changes occur, a firm’s strategic 
actions will be more reactive 
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5.7 FREQUENCY OF CORPORATE STRATEGIC ACTION PORTFOLIOS AND 
FIRM PERFORMANCE 
Performance can be an outcome of a continuous series of strategic actions, and Ferrier et al. 
(1999) argued that market leaders were less competitively aggressive and slow in carrying out 
competitive actions, and as a result they were more prone to experience market share erosion 
and/or dethronement relative to industry challengers. 
To understand the performance of a firm, one must analyze the firm as a system of 
interconnected choices: choices with respect to activities, policies and organizational structures, 
capabilities, and resources (Siggelkow, 2001). Ferrier (2001) argued that the more actions a firm 
carried out in response to environmental changes, the better its profitability and market share 
would be. A firm with more actions will enrich its series of action portfolios that ultimately lead 
to better performance. As a firm accumulates its strategic actions, it creates its internal 
organizational assets in the form of action repertoires, routines, and knowledge about how to 
carry out such actions (Miller & Chen, 1994). Both deregulatory and technological changes 
influence a firm’s decision to make specific strategic actions. Therefore, a firm executing more 
number of strategic actions will perform better. 
 
 
H7 A firm with higher frequency of corporate strategic action portfolios will 
perform better 
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5.8 VARIETY OF CORPORATE STRATEGIC ACTION PORTFOLIOS AND FIRM 
PERFORMANCE 
Variety of strategic action portfolios looks at a firm’s propensity to execute broader range of 
corporate strategic activities as opposed to concentrating on a narrow range of strategic activities 
in a given year (Miller & Chen, 1996). A firm carrying broad and complex strategic action 
portfolios will experience better profitability than those with narrow and simple ones (Ferrier, 
2001). Prior studies have argued that a firm’s success led to action simplicity, and its 
performance consequence is negative when environmental changes had occurred as in case of the 
US airline and trucking industries (Audia et al., 2000). A function of organizational and 
environmental properties such as a firm’s good past performance, munificent homogeneous 
market, a lack of breadth in competitive experiences, and the complacency that accompanies a 
firm’s age and size are all attributed to competitive simplicity that attenuates managerial search 
or restricts knowledge of competitive alternatives (Miller & Chen, 1996). While routines and 
stability induce a firm to converge and be persistent with its simple action portfolios, 
opportunistic adaptations through various strategic action portfolios are more likely among firms 
facing environmental changes (Miller et al., 1996). 
 
 
H8 A firm with higher variety of corporate strategic action portfolios will perform 
better 
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In this section, I explained the underlying relationships between a firm’s strategic 
action portfolios and performance in response to deregulatory and technological changes. 
The above hypotheses focused on two properties of action portfolios, frequency and 
variety. The next section will operationalize the eight hypotheses that will be tested in my 
study. 
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6.0  DATA AND ANALYSIS 
As indicated earlier, the US telecom industry provides a fast-changing industry setting as 
evidenced by regulatory and technological changes during the last 20 years. While various types 
of competitive dynamics arguments have been discussed in the US airline industry (Miller & 
Chen, 1996) and the global steel industry (Hopkins, 2003; Gnyawali et al., 2006), the complexity 
and the evolving nature of the US telecom industry structure provides an another interesting and 
a renewed research setting to extend the existing literatures in strategic actions and corporate 
strategy (Chen, 1996; Ferrier et al., 1999). 
While some prior studies in the telecom industry setting were mainly focused on the 
earlier periods in the US telecom history, the current competitive landscape requires a whole new 
perspective on the public policy, technology and competitive strategic behaviors among key 
players. For example, Barnett (1997) looked at the dynamics of competitive intensity among 
telephone operators in PA from 1879 to 1934. However, it was the era when FCC did not exist to 
regulate the industry in 1934. A firm’s strategic actions then were quite different from those of 
the current telecom operators in the 1990s. Even though there were many independent telecom 
carriers offering services regionally, AT&T dominated the US telecom industry since its 
inception to the marketplace. Koski & Majumdar (2002) covered the last 20 year period from 
1984 to 2004, but their focus was to examine how new entrants (responding to the introduction 
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of the 1996 Telecom Act) influenced the behavior of incumbents. Also, their scope of strategic 
actions included both strategic and tactical actions as Miller & Chen (1996) did.  
Smith & Zeithaml (1996) studied the differences in the RBOCs’ redeploying and 
managing portfolios of corporate strategic actions prior to the 1996 Telecom Act, where some 
RBOCs’ international market experiences influenced their successful performance in the 
domestic market later. Also, Noda & Collis (2001) explored how intra-industry firm 
heterogeneity shaped the US cellular rollout strategies among the seven RBOCs prior to the 1996 
Telecom Act. Outside the US, Fjeldstad (2004) looked at the European mobile phone operators’ 
strategic actions as they faced a more complex and dynamic environment, and indicated that 
market penetration, concentration, and time evolution drove the likelihood of inter-firm 
cooperation and the types of strategic actions taken by key telephone operators. 
The current study focuses on the corporate strategic action portfolios as the RBOCs’ 
strategic adaptation mechanism in order to cope with the evolving competitive dynamics in the 
US telecom industry. While Miller & Chen (1996) provided with meaningful insights for 
competitive dynamics in the US airline industry, their results did not capture the effective 
relationship between strategic actions and firm performance due to the wide range of strategic 
and tactical actions17
The current study focuses on a few key corporate strategic actions as determining drivers 
for competitive dynamics in the US telecom industry. As the market experiences both 
deregulatory and technological transformations, these corporate strategic actions play very 
important role in adapting to or aligning with a new industry paradigm. This study investigates 
two properties of corporate strategic action portfolios – frequency and variety.  Even though 
 being considered altogether. 
                                                 
17 Miller & Chen (1996) included 21 strategic and tactical actions 
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there are many other important properties in relating to firm’s corporate strategic action 
portfolios, the above two properties are the most commonly researched ones in the competitive 
dynamics literature (Chen & MacMillan, 1992; Grimm & Smith, 1997; Ferrier, 1999; Ferrier et 
al., 2004; Miller & Chen, 1996; and Miller & Chen, 1994, 1996). This study also tests the 
importance of frequency and variety of corporate strategic action portfolios on performance. By 
focusing on to the key strategic actions, defined as corporate strategic action portfolios, it will 
give us more meaningful insights to investigate the relationships between strategic actions and 
firm performance. 
6.1 DATA COLLECTION 
The RBOCs’ key corporate strategic actions were compiled from the SDC Platinum Database18. 
First, firm-level corporate strategic action data included the RBOCs’ key strategic actions that 
occurred chronologically between 1984 and 2004. Next additional information were coded such 
as the participating firms’ geographic locations (domestic vs. foreign) and industry 
classifications (SIC 481319
                                                 
18 2.3 version 
19 SIC 4813 – Telecommunications (wired) 
 vs. non-4813). While some strategic action data contained 
corresponding dollar values to complete the transactions, many other strategic actions such as 
strategic alliance actions could be focusing on the non-monetary relationships among 
participants with no dollar values to be reported in completing the transactions. For those 
strategic actions with no monetary values, detailed approximation process was conducted to fill 
in the missing values. 
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Firm-level performance variables were readily extractable from the Compustat database 
in the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). Key financial performance data such as return 
on investments (ROI) and return on assets (ROA) were also extracted from the Compustat 
database. Each firm’s 10Ks (SEC filing) were consulted to check the validity of firm-level 
strategic actions and performance variables. 
Industry-specific control variables were collected from several governmental agencies. 
For the total US population and Gross Domestic Product (GDP), US Department of Commerce’s 
Bureau of Economic Analysis and Bureau of the Census data were used. Since the Census data 
were not available between 2000 and 2004, the total US population’s annual estimates20 from the 
Census Bureau were used. For the total number of wireless subscribers, CTIA21
6.2 MEASURES 
's Semi Annual 
Wireless Industry Survey from January 1985 to December 2005 was used. 
To empirically test the relationships among variables collected from the multiple data sources, 
key measures for independent, dependent and control variables are detailed in this section. For 
the relationships between corporate strategic action portfolios and performance, different 
financial performance measures including return on assets (ROA) are considered. Two of the 
most frequently used attributes, frequency and variety of strategic action portfolios, are used as 
independent variables in this study. Measures for these two attributes are similar to Miller & 
                                                 
20 Table 1: Annual Estimates of the Population for the US: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2004 (NST-EST2004-01), 
Population Division, US Census Bureau, December 22, 2004 
21 CTIA – The Wireless Association (www.ctia.org) is an international organization representing all sectors of 
wireless communications – cellular, personal communication services and enhanced specialized mobile radio 
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Chen (1996) and Gnyawali et al. (2006). Lastly, some industry-specific and firm-specific control 
variables are added to control the relationships between a firm’s strategic action portfolios and 
environmental changes. 
6.2.1 Dependent Variables 
The probability of a firm’s survival is one of the strongest measures for performance, and 
circumvents the well-understood limitations of the widely used financial accounting and market-
based measures. Among the seven original RBOCs being incorporated in 1984, only four 
RBOCs (AT&T (formerly SBC), Bell South22
Other than measuring a firm’s survival, the main dependent variables in this study are 
financial performance measures such as return on invested capital (ROIC) and return on assets 
(ROA). These two variables are frequently used accounting measures to test the relationships 
between a firm’s strategic actions and performance (Miller & Chen, 1996; Ferrier, 1999). ROIC 
is calculated by dividing firm’s net income after tax with the sum of stockholder’s equity and 
debt from. It takes the same approach to calculate ROA, replacing invested capital (IC) for firms’ 
total assets. Since the key corporate strategic actions in this study are closely related to a firm’s 
, Verizon (formerly Bell Atlantic including GTE 
and NYNEX), and Qwest (formerly US West) are in operation by the end of 2004. It is 
worthwhile to compare the patterns of these surviving RBOCs’ corporate strategic action 
portfolios to those who are no longer in business and see if there are any differences between 
these two groups. 
                                                 
22 AT&T (formerly SBC) acquired Bell South in 2006 
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asset bases and investment decisions, these two accounting measures will show positive 
relationships with frequency and variety of corporate strategic action portfolios. 
 
 
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) 
= NOPLAT (net operating profit less adjusted taxes) / IC (invested capital) 
= (revenue–COGS–operating expenses–depreciation charges–adjusted taxes) / (value of 
stockholder’s equity + value of debt) 
 
Return on Assets (ROA) 
= NOPLAT (net operating profit less adjusted taxes) / TA (total assets) 
= (revenue–COGS–operating expenses–depreciation charges–adjusted taxes) / TA (total assets) 
 
 
6.2.2 Independent Variables 
The seven RBOCs’ corporate strategic actions are coded from the SDC database. Strategic 
alliance actions include a broader range of firm’s partnering with other firms from equity 
partnerships to the long term marketing relationships. As long as any RBOCs are involved in the 
strategic alliance transactions, all of their domestic and foreign alliances are entered into the 
sample. 
M&A actions include when any of the seven RBOCs acquire more than 50% of other 
firm’s total equity (or assets). The same reasoning is applied to divestiture actions when the 
seven RBOCs divest any of their existing businesses (or assets) to others. In addition, the seven 
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RBOCs’ actions are further categorized into firm size (RBOCs vs. non-RBOCs), service scope 
(SIC 4813 vs. non-SIC 4813) and geographic location (domestic vs. foreign). These detailed 
categorizations can be applied to code different dimensions of corporate strategic actions. 
However, only the total annual counts of corporate strategic actions at their effective date are 
considered in this study. 
Miller & Chen (1996) conceptualized the construct of competitive simplicity23
In order to determine the impact of frequency of corporate strategic action portfolios on 
performance, each action’s reported transaction amount (in million dollars) can be aggregated 
annually. Thus, the differential impacts of a single mega-M&A action versus multiple smaller-
 in three 
different dimensions. This study follows Miller & Chen (1996)’s approach, using two of their 
three index variables – frequency and variety - to measure firm’s corporate strategic action 
portfolios. 
Frequency of corporate strategic action portfolios is the total number (or annual dollar 
values) of a firm’s corporate strategic actions in a given year (Miller & Chen, 1996; Gnyawali et 
al., 2006). Three major corporate strategic actions – strategic alliance, M&A and divestiture 
actions will be individually counted to measure the frequency of a firm’s corporate strategic 
action portfolios. For some specific strategic actions, it takes more than a year from the 
announcement of the individual strategic action to the actual effective date. In this study, the 
effective date of strategic actions is considered for annual action counts. And then, they are 
summed up in counts and dollar values. 
                                                 
23 Miller & Chen (1996)’s three indexes are following. The R index is a range measuring the number of types of 
actions – an inverse index of simplicity, the C index is a concentration assessing the numerical emphasis on those 
most commonly employed types of actions, and the D index is a dominance assessing the single most common type 
of action employed by a firm – the smaller the range of types of actions, the greater the concentration on a few types 
of  actions, or the more dominance a single type of action, the simpler the competitive repertoires (p. 426) 
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scale corporate strategic actions will be correctly reflected in the analysis of firm-level 
performance. When the corresponding dollar values of strategic actions are missing in the SDC 
database, I look at other sources such as a firm’s 10K annual reports. If such efforts are not 
successful, I take the approximate dollar estimates drawn from the same corporate strategic 
action types. For strategic actions with missing dollar values, I took strategic actions with dollar 
values separately. Then, dollar values are converted to dollar values in the base year of 1984. I 
also took into account of strategic actions’ characteristics such as action types (M&A, divestment 
and strategic alliances) and action scope (foreign vs. domestic). Based upon the characteristics of 
these actions’ characteristics; average dollar values (base year) are calculated and these dollar 
values are applied to strategic actions with missing dollar values. With respect to the total 
number of a firm’s corporate strategic actions in a given year, this study takes a similar approach 
to that used in Gnyawali et al. (2006). 
 
 
Frequency of corporate strategic action portfolios for firm i = ∑ N ik 
where Nik refers to the number of four corporate strategic actions that firm i undertook in 
a given year. 
 
 
Variety of corporate strategic action portfolios is the range of strategic actions undertaken 
by a firm across different corporate strategic actions (Miller & Chen, 1996; Gnyawali et al., 
2006). Gnyawali et al. (2006) defined the competitive variety as the range of actions undertaken 
by a firm across the various aspects of the value chain. Miller & Chen (1996) defined the 
concentration index based on the standard deviation of the standard scores across the 21 types of 
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actions for an airline in a given year, and this standard deviation was standardized by dividing 
the total number of actions in order to adjust for the firm-size differences (p. 427). 
 
 
Variety of corporate strategic action portfolios for firm i = 1-∑ (Nij / Ni)2 
where Ni, j is the number of actions in the jth aspect of four corporate strategic actions 
for firm i; thus, (Ni, j /Ni) is the proportion of each corporate strategic actions from the 
corporate strategic action portfolios for i.  If firm is focusing on a single corporate action 
type, variety of action portfolios will be close to zero. 
 
 
For environmental changes, both deregulatory and technological changes are considered 
as firms adapt their frequency and variety of strategic action portfolios. For deregulatory changes 
in this study, the revision of Telecom Act in 1996 is used. The revision was the most 
comprehensive deregulatory change that reshaped the telecom industry environment during the 
20 year period. The year of 1996 was used as a year of deregulatory changes in this study. For 
example, it eliminated the regional coverage restrictions and allowed new entrants to serve the 
basic telecom services. According to Kim & Prescott (2005), form of deregulatory process in 
telecom industry was low in pace and scope, therefore, a firm’s strategic actions would be 
considered and executed in multiple-years. To count for such industry characteristics, several 
time ranges are used as dummy variables. For example, year 1995 (1 year minus from 1996) and 
year 1997 (1 year plus from 1996) are used as ± 1 year window period to examine if frequency 
of firms’ strategic action portfolios change depending upon different pre- and post-time ranges 
when environmental changes occur. 
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Among many other technological changes in this industry, the emergence of wireless 
technologies is the focus of this study. In the late ‘1990s, 3G wireless standards became more 
apparent as the next generation wireless technology in the industry. As a result, key telecom 
operators began to consider more strategic actions in order to deploy more advanced wireless 
technologies and services. The year of 2000 was used as a year of technological changes in this 
study. It was the year when the annual total number of wireless subscribers outnumbered those of 
the fixed-line telephony subscribers for the first time. It was one of the major technological 
shifts, showing the signs of increasing growth rate of new telecom technologies and services 
such as wireless and the high-speed Internet services. To cope with such shifts, telecom operators 
had to consider modifying their corporate strategic action portfolios in order to sustain their 
sustainable competitive advantages. Another technological characteristic during the same period 
is that different communication technologies have begun to converge with each other. To name a 
few, VoIP24
                                                 
24 VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) 
 and CATV providers can now serve traditional telephony through different 
communication platform. Technological convergence forces incumbents (e.g. RBOCs) to 
formulate their strategic actions by rearranging their resource pools in anticipation of competing 
against new entrants. 
Similar to deregulatory change dummy variables, several time ranges are used as 
technological change dummy variables. For example, year 1999 (1 year minus from 2000) and 
year 2001 (1 year plus from 2000) are used as ± 1 year window period to examine if frequency 
of firms’ strategic action portfolios change depending upon different pre- and post-time ranges 
when technological changes occur. 
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6.2.3 Control Variables 
Firm age and size are often considered as organization-related control variables (Miller & Chen, 
1996). In case of the seven RBOCs, since all were divested from AT&T at the same time in 
1984, the age of each RBOC’ is almost the same for all. However, firm size varies among the 
seven RBOCs. In this study, each RBOC’s total asset size is controlled. Also, each RBOC’s 
major serving areas, measured as the number of the top 100 MSAs each RBOC serves, can be 
assessed for the firm size effects. The RBOCs’ cross-ownership with foreign telecom operators 
can be controlled as well since it may affect the RBOCs’ decisions to modify strategic action 
portfolios. Even though major global partnerships (entities such as World Partners, Concert and 
Global One) are now inactive (or even dissolved in many cases), their roles as global alliance 
networks (Lee & Madhavan, 2004), learning experiences (Smith and Zeithaml, 1996; Gulati, 
1995) among global partners will influence to the RBOCs’ frequency and variety of strategic 
action portfolios. Industry controls such as the growth of annual GDP and annual population are 
also included in this study. Summary statistics of each variable are also shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics at 10% Significance Level 
 Obs =137 Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Allcountfreq 4.8540 4.4796 1.0000              
2 SQAllvarietyp 3159.883 2134.064 0.6237* 1.0000             
3 LNAllrealfreq 5.5488 3.2134 0.6944* 0.5164* 1.0000            
4 SQAllrealvarp 1556.901 1640.281 0.3814* 0.6036*  1.0000           
5 Y9597 0.1533 0.3616 0.2908* 0.2529* 0.2391*  0.0000          
6 Y9498 0.2774 0.4493 0.2650* 0.2089* 0.2120* 0.1613 0.6868* 1.0000         
7 Y9901 0.0729 0.2611      -0.1738* 1.0000        
8 Y9802 0.1241 0.3309    -0.1654 -0.1601  0.7455* 1.0000       
9 Pcpincome 21445.8 5527.201 0.1520 0.1697 0.1674  0.1667 0.2517* 0.2854* 0.3618* 1.0000      
10 Tasset 33323.64 31907.71      -0.2019*   0.6041* 1.0000     
11 Opincome 7803030 7336214       0.1678  0.6241* 0.9646* 1.0000    
12 Wsub 259851.3 16183.23 0.2157* 0.1752 0.1809*  0.1507 0.2483* 0.4639* 0.4861* 0.8714* 0.5278* 0.5649* 1.0000   
13 Uspop 7888.48 1383.583 0.2523* 0.2249* 0.1802*  0.1492 0.2259* 0.3358* 0.4157* 0.9146* 0.5649* 0.5960* 0.9448* 1.0000  
14 Nrival 179.438 112.0771        0.1443 0.3219* 0.5577* 0.5492* 0.4501* 0.5312* 1.0000 
* 5% significance level (Obs = 111 for SQAllvarietyp and SQAllrealvarietyp) 
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6.3 ANALYSIS 
From the previous section, I explained that strategic actions and environmental changes interact 
with each other. Both institutional and technical environments play important roles in shaping a 
firm’s strategic behavior. 
Previous research has taken different approaches to study the impact of environmental 
changes on a firm’s strategic actions and performance. First, event study method is frequently 
used to look at the market responses to accounting information announcements. This approach 
uses dichotomous event as independent variable and explains variance in a continuous dependent 
variable (Harrison, 2006). For event studies in capital market research, stock price variance 
model is assessed whether specific events create abnormal stock returns. Specific event can be a 
release of information to market participants through the news media about corporate or 
governmental actions (Park, 2004), and abnormal returns are the differences between the 
observed returns and the estimated returns derived from a particular stock return model (Park, 
2004; Brown & Warner, 1985). 
Second, business history studies use the case method to address the impact of 
environmental changes on firm’s performance. For example, Christensen (1993) reported how 
the large-scale, integrated firms failed to respond to the emerging market segments, and they 
were driven out the market by networks of less integrated firms with more improved, new-
architecture products in the disk drive industry. Barley (1986) linked institutions and strategic 
actions to outline a theory of how technology impacted on different organizational structures by 
altering institutionalized roles and patterns of interaction. Munir & Phillips (2005) explored the 
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role of institutional entrepreneurs in the process of institutional change that coincided with the 
adoption of a new technology using the detailed case study of Kodak’s roll film camera. 
Third, the event history model, such as survival model (e.g. hazard model) in 
organizational ecology, uses continuous and other independent variables to explain time-
dependent rate of a dichotomous dependent variable (Harrison, 2006).  Wholey & Sanchez 
(1991) looked at the entry and exit rates of different types of firms when institutional changes 
occurred. Barnett & Carroll (1993) and Barnett (1997) discussed the impact of institutional 
constraints on the organizational survival of the early telephone operators in PA. Russo (2001) 
looked at the regulatory effects on creating new field such as independent (or non-utility) power 
production in America from 1978 to 1992. 
Fourth, the visual mapping method provides evidence of the presence of industry patterns 
of strategy and suggests that early and late adopters exist in the empirical findings of the UK 
insurance industry between 1990 and 1996 (Webb & Pettigrew, 1999). And the speed at which a 
company would adopt an innovation is determined by the characteristics of the innovation and a 
number of contextual factors, including the nature of the industry and a variety of organizational 
and individual characteristics (Webb & Pettigrew, 1999). Also, Nath & Newell (1998) used the 
causal map methods to describe managers’ interpretations of environment events and how firms 
responded to such environmental changes to achieve a better “fit”, or the alignment between a 
firm’s strategy and its environment (Venkatraman & Prescott, 1990). 
This study first details the seven RBOCs’ different strategic action portfolios with 
graphical illustrations, describing the evolution of the seven RBOCs’ survival after the 1984 
AT&T divestiture. Graphical illustrations, as later shown from Figure 2 to Figure 7, provide 
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strong visual effects on the firm’s corporate strategic actions in response to environmental 
changes. 
In addition to various qualitative analyses, different quantitative analyses can be utilized 
to relate the firm’s strategic behaviors in response to environmental changes. Elsbach (1994) 
used ANOVA to compare the effectiveness of verbal accounts in managing organizational 
legitimacy in the California cattle industry. Delacroix & Swaminathan (1991) used an event-
history analysis to examine the joint effect of organizational characteristics and of environmental 
variation on organizational change in the wine industry. Afuah (2004) used the least squares 
dummy variables to explore the impact of technological changes on a firm’s co-opetitors on a 
firm’s entry timing. 
For the impacts of environmental changes on firm’s frequency of corporate strategic 
action portfolios, I have considered different analyses such as ANOVA, least squares dummy 
variables (LSDV), Wilcoxon rank sum (Mann-Whitney) test (for non-parametric models) and the 
negative binomial regression models. For the simple comparison of environmental changes 
impacting on a firm’s frequency of corporate strategic action portfolios, this study has 
extensively utilized the dummy variable regression with least squares dummy variables (LSDV) 
estimator. Since this study focuses on the corporate strategic action portfolios of the seven 
RBOCs, using the LSDV method is a practical proposition given the need for a small number of 
dummy variables. In other word, the LSDV estimator is practical only when N is small. 
In order to use the LSDV estimator, frequency and variety of firms’ unique corporate 
strategic action portfolios are separately converted into the natural logarithm and quadratic forms 
respectively. To complement the unique patterns of firms’ corporate strategic action portfolios in 
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responding to the tested environmental changes, the results from alternative models such as the 
non-parametric model of Wilcoxon rank-sum test will be discussed in the separate section. 
To capture the environmental changes on strategic action portfolios, I break down the 
dummy variables into several time spans. In this study, I use the year dummy variables at the 
time of deregulatory and technological changes (t) plus t ± 1 year variables. For deregulatory 
changes, the year of Telecom Act 1996 is used as the base year, and then, y9597 (1995-1997) 
dummy variable is selected. For technological changes, y9901 dummy (1999-2001) variable is 
selected when the total number of wireless service subscriptions have outnumbered the fixed 
serviced subscriptions in 2000. 
 
 
Frequency of corporate strategic action portfolios i = β0 + β1 firm-specific variable +δ 
year dummy variable it + ε 
 
Variety of corporate strategic action portfolios i = β0 + β1 firm-specific variable +δ year 
dummy variable it + ε 
 
 
For the impact of environmental changes on a firm’s variety of corporate strategic action 
portfolios, the LSDV estimator is also utilized. Statistical operationalizations from hypotheses 
H1 to H4 will be similar except for substituting frequency of corporate strategic action portfolios 
with variety of corporate strategic action portfolios in response to deregulatory and technological 
changes. 
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The occurrence of a firm’s strategic actions will be proactively frequent even before 
deregulatory changes occur as tested in H5. On the other hand, the occurrence of a firm’s 
strategic actions will be reactively frequent after technological changes occur as tested in H6. 
The variety of corporate strategic action portfolios will be also examined if they show any 
proactiveness or reactiveness nature of strategic actions when environmental changes occur. 
These two hypotheses are tested with the LSDV estimator. To examine a firm’s proactiveness vs. 
reactiveness of strategic actions in response to environmental changes, different time frames with 
t±2 years of deregulatory and technological changes will be considered as dummy variables to 
see if they show significantly different coefficients in the regression model. In this study, for 
deregulatory changes, I look at the frequency of corporate strategic action portfolios with t±2 
year (1994-96 and 1996-98) dummies. For technological changes, another t±2 year (1998-2000 
and 2000-2002) dummies are taken to compare with the frequency of corporate strategic action 
portfolios. Both count and dollar measures are used to test these hypotheses. 
For the relationship between the frequency and variety of corporate strategic action 
portfolios and performance, random effect GLS regression method with robust standard error 
estimator is used. Starting with base model for H7 and H8, some control variables are used. For 
firm-specific control variables, a firm’s annual total assets and profit margins are controlled. 
Firms with more assets and profit margins will consider more frequent and various strategic 
actions since they have enough resource pools to play with. The total number of rival firms in 
each RBOC’s service areas (by state) is controlled because the intensity among competitors will 
affect firm performance. The total number of wireless service subscribers are also controlled 
since the fast-growing wireless services will be greatly affecting the RBOCs’ performance. The 
remaining two control variables are considered to take account of industry-specific 
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characteristics. Both annual per capita personal income and the total number of population in the 
firm’s service area (by state) are added since this information will affect the firm’s desire to 
consider the frequency and variety of corporate strategic actions. After the above control 
variables are considered, two independent variables in this study, frequency and variety of 
corporate strategic action portfolios are added and tested separately. 
 
 
Base model  
Y(performance) = a + b1*X1 + b2*X2 + b3*X3 + b4*X4 + b5*X5 + b6*X6 + εi   
X1 : firms’ total assets 
X2 : firms’ profit margins 
X3 : the total number of rival firms in the firm’s service area (by state) 
X4 : the total number of wireless subscriptions in the firms’ service area (by state) 
X5 : per capita personal income (annual) in the firms’ service area (by state) 
X6 : the total number of population in the firms’ service area (by state) 
 
Frequency – Firm Performance Model 
Y (Performance) = a + b0*Xf + b1*X1 + b2*X2 + b3*X3 + b4*X4 + b5*X5 + b6*X6 + εi   
Xf : frequency of firms’ strategic actions   
 
Variety – Firm Performance Model  
Y (Performance) = a + b0*Xv+ b1*X1 + b2*X2 + b3*X3 + b4*X4 + b5*X5 + b6*X6 + εi   
Xv : variety of firms’ strategic actions  
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To analyze the sensitivity of the above testing methods, a couple of other alternative 
methods are also considered. The ANOVA model tests if frequency and variety of a firm’s 
corporate strategic action portfolios will significantly differ during the selected years. Also, the 
non-parametric model of Wilcoxon rank sum (Mann-Whitney) test can be used to determine 
whether there is a difference between the pre-event and the post-event period populations. This 
alternative can be effective when it requires no assumptions about the population probability 
distributions. 
For count measures, negative binomial regression model can be complemented to see if 
frequency of corporate strategic action portfolios is more likely when regulatory changes occur. 
Organizational ecologists have extensively used this model to analyze the founding rates of firms 
in the industry. It overcomes the limitation of the Poisson model through the inclusion of an 
over-dispersion parameter (Swaminathan, 1998). The negative binomial model is more flexible 
(than Poisson model) by allowing the variance of the counts to have a different value than the 
mean. The model assumes that the coefficient of variation of the expected count increases 
linearly with the expected count (Swaminathan, 1998). The same approach is used here to model 
the relationship between the frequency of strategic action portfolios (rate), λt, and the vector of 
covariates (deregulatory changes), xt, where ε has a gamma distribution. The model is specified 
as follows; 
 
 
ln λt = α + βxt + ε 
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In order to look at the sensitivity of using different time spans, I test both t ± 1 and t ± 2 
year dummy variables to see if different time ranges will affect the frequency and variety of 
corporate strategic action portfolios. 
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7.0  RESULTS 
The results of this study should be taken into consideration of the US Telecom industry context. 
Prior to AT&T’s divestiture in 1984, AT&T, so called ‘Ma Bell’, dominated the industry, and 
the other firms’ strategic considerations were extremely limited. Since then, competitive industry 
landscapes have emerged with more new telecom providers. Even though this study is limited to 
look at the key seven RBOCs’ corporate strategic action portfolios, their strategic significances 
are very important to shape the most of the US telecom industry structure. Their market shares 
are still more than 80% of the wire-line telephone market, and they have strong presences in the 
wireless and broadband Internet services as well. The following section will look at the graphical 
illustrations of the RBOCs’ corporate strategic action portfolios first, and then report the 
statistical results of hypotheses shown in the previous section. 
7.1 GRAPHICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 
This study first details the RBOCs’ different patterns of corporate strategic action portfolios with 
graphical illustrations. In prior studies, Barley (1986) used the plot charts to discuss the impact 
of CT scanner technological changes on organizational structure. Webb & Pettingrew (1999) 
also presented the visual mapping charts to provide the temporal development of strategic 
patterns in the US Insurance industry. In this study, graphical illustrations below (Figure 2 and 
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Figure 3) clearly indicate that corporate strategic action portfolios show interesting patterns when 
deregulatory changes occur. The increasing pattern of corporate strategic action portfolios is 
detected around the event of deregulatory change in 1996 when count measure is used. 
Apparently, graphical illustrations using the action counts and the action’s dollar measures show 
different patterns. When dollar value is used, frequency of corporate strategic action portfolios is 
peaked in 1997 just after the deregulatory event has occurred. 
For technological changes, corporate strategic action portfolios do not show any 
significant increases in 2000 when count measure is used. But dollar measure shows another 
peak of increasing frequency of corporate strategic action portfolios around the year 2000 when 
technological focus has shifted to the wireless from the wire-line telecom services. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Frequency of Corporate Strategic Action Portfolios – All Firms (Count) 
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Figure 3 Frequency of Corporate Strategic Action Portfolios – All Firms (Dollar) 
 
 
Interestingly, internal development actions take up the disproportionate majority of 
strategic actions in a given year when count measure is used. Since the proxy variables in 
measuring a firm’s internal development actions have something to do with these results, I 
decided that a firm’s internal development actions be analyzed in a separate section. 
When dollar value is used, domestic M&A actions are the most frequently used strategic 
actions among the RBOCs when deregulatory event is occurred around the year of 1996. Also, 
even though the counts of strategic alliance actions are relatively higher than that of M&A 
actions, the different patterns of M&A actions in dollar measures show important strategic 
impacts on the competitive dynamics. When count measure is considered, strategic actions do 
not increase when technological changes occur. On the other hand, strategic action counts are 
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decreased after the year of 2000. When dollar measure is used, frequency of corporate strategic 
action portfolios is once again peaked in 2000. 
The following figures (Figure 4 ~ Figure 7) show clearly that each firm has different 
patterns of strategic actions at different time period when dollar measure is used (figures in count 
measure are not shown here). Overall, a group of firms, which have been acquired by others 
during the study period (Nynex, Ameritech, and Pacific Telesis) show lower level of frequency 
and variety of corporate strategic actions. On the other hand, Bell Atlantic (now Verizon) and 
Bell South show relatively higher level of frequency and variety of strategic actions. Bell South 
has been consistently focused on all three strategic actions both for domestic and foreign 
operations. On the other hand, Bell Atlantic has been involved in two major mega-billion deals 
with Ameritech and Nynex, and ultimately changed its corporate name to Verizon. Whereas Bell 
South has maintained its conservative strategic behavior from the AT&T’s era, Verizon’s 
strategic actions have temporally evolved from one action to others such as domestic M&A 
actions to foreign JV actions. Unlike Bell South and Bell Atlantic, SBC has been slow in 
executing the number of strategic actions until SBC began to participate in the mega-billion deals 
later in the 1990s’. 
Strategic actions from US West and Qwest show interesting changes as well. US West 
has been heavily involved in numerous strategic actions until it was acquired by a foreign 
operator, Qwest. Qwest’s different patterns of strategic actions, focusing more on the domestic 
operations, have something to do with the changes in Qwest’s management style responding to 
environmental changes. 
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Figure 4 Variety of Corporate Strategic Action Portfolios – Ameritech (Dollar) 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Variety of Corporate Strategic Action Portfolios – Bell Atlantic (Dollar) 
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Figure 6 Variety of Corporate Strategic Action Portfolios – Bell South (Dollar) 
 
 
 
Figure 7 Variety of Corporate Strategic Action Portfolios – NYNEX (Dollar) 
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Figure 8 Variety of Corporate Strategic Action Portfolios – Qwest (Dollar) 
 
 
 
Figure 9 Variety of Corporate Strategic Action Portfolios – SBC (Dollar) 
 
 
 
 
75 
 
 
 
Figure 10 Variety of Corporate Strategic Action Portfolios – US West (Dollar) 
 
 
 
Figure 11 Variety of Corporate Strategic Action Portfolios – Pacific Telesis (Dollar) 
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7.2 RESULTS OF FREQUENCY (VARIETY) OF CORPORATE STRATEGIC 
ACTION PORTFOLIOS AND DEREGULATORY (TECHNOLOGICAL) CHANGES  
For the relationships between frequency of corporate strategic action portfolios and deregulatory 
changes (H1), H1 is supported in count measure as well as in dollar measure. For frequency of 
corporate strategic action portfolios on technological changes (H2), H2 is not supported neither 
measures. 
For H1, when count measure is used, frequency of a firm’s corporate strategic action 
portfolios significantly increases around the time when deregulatory changes occur (significant 
at the 5% level). These results confirm that frequency (both count and dollar measures) of a 
firm’s corporate strategic action portfolios does increase when regulatory changes occur. 
For H2, neither count nor dollar measures are supportive. When alternative methods are 
used, their results do not show any significant improvement in testing H2. A few reasons not 
having significant results in H2 are discussed in the Limitation section later. 
For the relationships between variety of corporate strategic action portfolios and 
deregulatory changes (H3), H3 is supported at the 5% significance level when count measure is 
used. When dollar measure is used, the result is not supportive even at the 10% significance 
level. 
Variety of corporate strategic action portfolios on technological changes (H4) is not 
supported in both count and dollar measures. Thus, all else being equal, variety of a firm’s 
corporate strategic action portfolios is significantly increased as deregulatory changes occur only 
when count measure is used. 
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Table 2 Frequency (Variety) of Corporate Strategic Action Portfolios on Deregulatory Changes 
Least Squares 
Dummy Variables 
(LSDV) 
H1 H1 H3 H3 
Allcountfreq 
(count measure) 
LNAllrealfreq 
(dollar measure) 
SQAllvareityp 
(count measure) 
SQAllrealvarietyp 
(dollar measure) 
Y9597 t 3.52 2.44 2.55 0.51 
 P > [t] 0.001** 0.016** 0.012** 0.608 
** 5% Significance Level: * 10% Significance Level 
 
 
Table 3 Frequency (Variety) of Corporate Strategic Action Portfolios on Technological Changes 
Least Squares 
Dummy Variables 
(LSDV) 
H2 H2 H4 H4 
Allcountfreq 
(count measure) 
LNAllrealfreq 
(dollar measure) 
SQAllvareityp 
(count measure) 
SQAllrealvarietyp 
(dollar measure) 
Y9901 t -1.57 0.34 -0.48 -0.43 
 P > [t] 0.120 0.738 0.632 0.669 
** 5% Significance Level: * 10% Significance Level 
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7.3 RESULTS OF PROACTIVE VERSUS REACTIVE STRATEGIC RESPONSES 
TO ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES 
For proactive versus reactive strategic responses to environmental changes, a firm’s corporate 
strategic action portfolios tend to be more proactive when deregulatory changes occur (H5), and 
to be more reactive when technological changes occur (H6). 
Proactive strategic responses to deregulatory changes are supported in this study. 
Corporate strategic action portfolios in count measure are more frequent even prior to a change 
in deregulation. When both pre-event and post-event periods are compared, the standardized 
coefficient for pre-event period is 5.011 while the standardized coefficient for post-event period 
is 2.190 when count measure is tested. Even though both coefficients are significant at the 10% 
level, the frequency of a firm’s corporate action portfolios are twice more likely in the pre-event 
period. I compare the coefficients of pre-event period with post-event period to test the null 
hypothesis, H0: b pre-event period = b post-event period. The F value is 5.42 and is significant at the 5% 
level, indicating that the coefficient of pre-event period is significantly different from the 
coefficient of post-event period. The larger coefficient of the pre-event period indicates that a 
firm’s strategic actions will be more proactive when deregulatory changes occur. Frequency of 
corporate strategic action portfolios in dollar measure shows the meaningful significance when 
changes in deregulation. 
Furthermore, variety of a firm’s corporate strategic action portfolios shows consistent 
results. A firm takes various types of strategic actions proactively even before deregulatory 
changes occur. Thus, this study finds proactive strategic responses in the variety of a firm’s 
corporate strategic action portfolios when deregulatory changes occur. The significance levels 
are at the 5% both in count and dollar measures, but the differences in the coefficients of pre-
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event and post-event periods are much smaller when variety of a firms’ corporate strategic action 
portfolios are tested in H5. It is due to the fact that several mega-billion dollar M&A deals have 
been made just after deregulatory changes in 1996, and these excessive financial commitments 
have some effects on the significance level. During the pre-1996 period, a firm has been more 
flexible with executing different types of corporate strategic actions when count measure is 
considered. 
For H6, this study shows no significance that technological changes have to do with a 
firm’s reactive strategic responses. One interpretation may be that a firm does not take its 
strategic actions reactively after technological changes occur. Either count or dollar measures are 
not significant. For the RBOCs, technological changes may not play any significant motivating 
roles in considering strategic actions reactively. 
 
 
Table 4 Proactive versus Reactive Strategic Responses to Environmental Changes (Frequency) 
LSDV 
Deregulatory 
Changes 
H5 H5 LSDV 
Technological 
Changes 
H6 H6 
Allcountfreq 
(count measure) 
LNAllrealfreq 
(dollar measure) 
Allcountfreq 
(count measure) 
LNAllrealfreq 
(dollar measure) 
Y9496 t 4.55 3.66 Y0002 t -0.06 -0.05 
 P > [t] 0.000** 0.000**  P > [t] 0.950 0.964 
** 5% Significance Level; * 10% Significance Level 
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Table 5 Proactive versus Reactive Strategic Responses to Environmental Changes (Variety) 
LSDV 
Deregulatory 
Changes 
H5 H5 LSDV 
Technological 
Changes 
H6 H6 
SQAllvarietyp 
(count measure) 
SQAllrealvarietyp 
(dollar measure) 
SQAllvarietyp 
(count measure) 
SQAllrealvarietyp 
(dollar measure) 
Y9496 t 4.24 2.85 Y0002 t -1.48 -1.85 
 P > [t] 0.000** 0.005**  P > [t] 0.143 0.068* 
** 5% Significance Level; * 10% Significance Level 
 
 
7.4 RESULTS OF FREQUENCY (VARIETY) OF CORPORATE STRATEGIC 
ACTION PORTFOLIOS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE  
For the relationships between frequency (variety) of corporate strategic action portfolios and firm 
performance (H7 & H8), only the frequency hypotheses (H7) measured in count and dollar 
measures are supported at the 10% and 5% significance levels respectively. 
To test the hypotheses 7 and 8, first, the base model indicates that all control variables are 
significantly related to the firms’ performance at the 5% level. Both ROA and ROI performance 
indicators are tested, but the results using ROA performance indicators are shown here. When 
frequency and variety constructs are tested, both count and dollar measures are separately tested 
for ROA performance indicator. 
Investigating the relationship between frequency of a firm’s corporate strategic action 
portfolios and performance in count measure shows that a firm with more frequent corporate 
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strategic action portfolios performs better at the 10% significance level. When the dollar measure 
is used, the result is significant at the 5% significance level. It is an interesting result that needs 
to be further investigated for the detailed relationships between a firm’s corporate strategic 
action portfolios and performance. While the count measure of a firm’s corporate strategic action 
portfolios provides us with the positive nature of a firm’s performance, the dollar measure of a 
firm’s corporate strategic action portfolios provides us with more meaningful picture between a 
firm’s corporate strategic action portfolios and performance. 
Regarding the relationship between variety of a firm’s strategic action portfolios and 
performance, a firm with variety of corporate strategic action portfolios does not show any better 
performance with any one of count or dollar measures. Once again, in the late 1990s’, the 
RBOCs have been involved in the series of mega-billion dollar M&A deals with other telecom 
operators. Also, they have tried to diversify into different layers of info-communication services 
by investing into the Internet start-ups and deploying the high-speed fiber-optic infrastructure. 
The market has not been favorable to all of these strategic actions along with bursting the 
Internet bubble in the 1990s’. This can be one of the reasons why the relationship between 
variety of corporate strategic action portfolios and performance shows insignificant results in 
Table 6. 
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Table 6 Frequency (Variety) of Corporate Strategic Action Portfolios and Firm Performance 
Random Effects 
GLS Regression 
With Robust SE 
Base Model Base Model H7 H7 H8 H8 
ROA ROI ROA 
Frequency 
ROA 
Frequency 
ROA 
Variety 
ROA 
Variety 
Variable   Allcountfreq LNAllrealfreq SQAllvarietyp SQAllrealvarietyp 
Measures   count dollar count dollar 
Z 3.01 2.13 3.14 2.93 3.48 3.54 
P >[Z] 0.003** 0.033** 0.002** 0.003** 0.001** 0.000** 
Uspop -0.0000801 -0.0001572 -0.0000842 -0.000074 -0.0000946 -0.0000933 
Z -2.57 -2.86 -3.61 -3.30 -3.73 -3.66 
P >[Z] 0.010** 0.004** 0.000** 0.001** 0.000** 0.000** 
Nrival 0.0032819 0.0108466 0.0034794 0.0036468 0.0039398 0.0038601 
Z 1.88 3.45 2.67 2.71 3.06 2.98 
P >[Z] 0.060* 0.001** 0.008* 0.007** 0.002** 0.003** 
Tasset -0.0000219 -0.0000543 -0.0000177 -0.0000184 -0.0000206 -0.0000214 
Z -4.15 -4.96 -3.93 -4.18 -4.95 -3.80 
P >[Z] 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
Promar 0.4131121 0.717757 0.4293664 0.4310544 0.4249868 0.4255102 
Z 8.18 5.88 8.92 8.74 9.09 8.84 
P >[Z] 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
pcpincome 0.000197 0.00047 0.0001699 0.0001544 0.0001708 0.0001719 
Z 2.63 3.99 3.52 3.25 3.36 3.40 
P >[Z] 0.008** 0.000** 0.000* 0.001** 0.001** 0.001 ** 
Allcountfreq   0.0548487    
Z   1.89    
P >[Z]   0.058*    
LNAllrealfreq    0.0573544   
Z    1.99   
P >[Z]    0.046**   
SQAllvarietyp     0.0000611  
Z     1.42  
P >[Z]     0.156  
SQAllrealvarietyp      0.000068 
Z      1.48 
P >[Z]      0.138 
** 5% Significance Level: * 10% Significance Level 
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7.5 ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS 
This section describes some alternative analysis using different estimation methods. Overall, the 
results in this section are confirming the results in the main section with some interesting 
comparisons. For the first four hypotheses (H1 ~ H4), different methods such as ANOVA, 
negative binomial regression and Wilcoxon rank sum test are used. Also, both ±1 year and ± 2 
year window dummy variables are tested in order to assess the firm’s different levels of 
frequency and variety of corporate strategic action portfolios responding to deregulatory and 
technological changes. For the relationship between a firm’s performance and corporate strategic 
action portfolios, return on investment (ROI) is used as an alternative performance indicator 
instead of ROA. 
For the relationship between frequency of a firm’s corporate strategic action portfolios 
and deregulatory changes (H1), H1 is supported, and both count and dollar measures result in the 
same results when all three alternative statistical methods are used. The only time H1 is not 
supported is when 2 year window (y9498) dummy variable is used with the negative binomial 
regression model. 
For frequency of a firm’s corporate strategic action portfolios on technological changes 
(H2), H2 is not supportive both in count and dollar measures when ANOVA and Wilcoxon rank 
sum test are used. Interestingly, when negative binomial regressions are tested using count 
measure for H2, both 1 year window (y9901) and 2 year window (y9802) dummy variables are 
significant at the 5% level. These contrasting results may indicate that the unique frequency 
patterns of a firm’s strategic actions (as shown in Figure 2) are properly captured using the 
negative binomial regression method. Also, the frequent numbers of a firm’s strategic actions are 
intensively executed during the narrower time span of environmental changes. 
84 
As shown in the graphical illustrations from Figure 2 to Figure 7, when collected sample 
distributions of a firm’s corporate strategic actions show the non-linear characteristics, non-
parametric model of Wilcoxon rank sum (Mann-Whitney) test is preferably used to other 
alternative models. When Wilcoxon rank sum test is used, the results are consistent with other 
alternative methods. H1 is supported both in count and dollar measures while H2 is not 
supported. 
Therefore, for H1, when count measure is used, the frequency of a firm’s corporate 
strategic actions increases significantly around the time when deregulatory changes occur 
(significant at the 5% level). The results are consistent with ANOVA, negative binomial 
regression, and Wilcoxon ran sum test. These results confirm that frequency of a firm’s corporate 
strategic action portfolios does increase when regulatory changes occur. 
For H2, when count measure is used, only the negative binomial regression model is 
significant at the 5% level. 
For the relationship between variety of a firm’s corporate strategic action portfolios and 
deregulatory changes (H3), H3 is supported when count measure is used, but for variety of a 
firm’s corporate strategic action portfolios on technological changes (H4), H4 is not even 
partially supported. All else being equal, variety of a firm’s corporate strategic action portfolios 
increases significantly as deregulatory changes occur when both count and dollar measures are 
used. The results are consistent with all alternative methods. However, variety of a firm’s 
corporate strategic action portfolios does not increase significantly as technological changes 
occur (H4). The relationship between variety of a firm’s corporate strategic action portfolios and 
technological changes is significant at the 10% level only when dollar measure is used with ±2 
year window dummy variable (y9802) in the Wilcoxon rank sum test model. 
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Table 7 Frequency (Variety) of Corporate Strategic Action Portfolios on Deregulatory Changes – Alt. I 
ANOVA H1 H1 H3 H3 
Allcountfreq 
(count measure) 
LNAllrealfreq 
(dollar measure) 
SQAllvareityp 
(count measure) 
SQAllrealvarietyp 
(dollar measure) 
Y9597 F 17.14 9.61 8.26 0.86 
 Prob > F 0.0001** 0.0024** 0.0049** 0.3572 
Y9498 F 13.18 6.82 5.22 3.08 
 Prob > F 0.0004** 0.0101** 0.0244** 0.0821 
** 5% Significance Level: * 10% Significance Level 
 
 
Table 8 Frequency (Variety) of Corporate Strategic Action Portfolios on Deregulatory Changes – Alt. II 
Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum Test 
H1 H1 H3 H3 
Allcountfreq 
(count measure) 
LNAllrealfreq 
(dollar measure) 
SQAllvareityp 
(count measure) 
SQAllrealvarietyp 
(dollar measure) 
Y9597 Z -3.141 -2.995 -2.634 -1.064 
 Prob > [Z] 0.0017** 0.0027** 0.0084** 0.2875 
Y9498 Z -3.250 -2.827 -2.164 -1.632 
 Prob > [Z] 0.0012** 0.0047** 0.0305** 0.1026* 
** 5% Significance Level: * 10% Significance Level 
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Table 9 Frequency of Corporate Strategic Action Portfolios on Deregulatory (Technological) Changes – 
Alt. III 
Negative Binomial 
Regression 
H1 H1 H2 H2 
Allcountfreq    
(count measure) 
LNAllcountfreq 
(count measure) 
SQAllcountfreq 
(count measure) 
SQAllcountfreq 
(count measure) 
Y9597 0.3688222    
Z 2.08    
P >[Z] 0.038**    
Y9498  0.1694455   
Z  0.96   
P >[Z]  0.338   
Y9901   -0.6714065  
Z   -2.09  
P >[Z]   0.037*  
Y9802    -0.7162647 
Z    -2.72 
P >[Z]    0.007** 
Pcpincome 0.0000404 0.0000415 0.0000572 0.0000646 
Z 2.28 2.16 3.28 3.65 
P >[Z] 0.023** 0.031** 0.001** 0.000** 
Tasset -0.0000285 -0.0000302 -0.0000378 -0.0000398 
Z -2.68 -2.76 -3.59 -3.82 
P >[Z] 0.007** 0.006** 0.000** 0.000** 
Opincome 0.0001179 0.0001262 0.0001622 0.00017 
Z 1.98 2.12 2.66 2.85 
P >[Z] 0.048** 0.034** 0.008** 0.004** 
** 5% Significance Level: * 10% Significance Level 
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Table 10 Frequency (Variety) of Corporate Strategic Action Portfolios on Technological Changes – Alt. I 
ANOVA 
H2 H2 H4  H4  
Allcountfreq  
(count measure) 
LNAllrealfreq 
(dollar measure) 
SQAllvareityp 
(count measure) 
SQAllrealvarietyp 
(dollar measure) 
Y9901 F 1.32 0.56 0.49 0.96 
 Prob > F 0.2531 0.4546 0.4863 0.3308 
Y9802 F 0.14 0.02 0.86 0.83 
 Prob > F 0.7100 0.9016 0.3550 0.3649 
** 5% Significance Level: * 10% Significance Level 
 
 
Table 11 Frequency (Variety) of Corporate Strategic Action Portfolios on Technological Changes – Alt. II 
Wilcoxon  
Rank Sum Test 
H2 H2 H4 H4 
Allcountfreq  
(count measure) 
LNAllrealfreq   
(dollar measure) 
SQAllvareityp  
(count measure) 
SQAllrealvarietyp 
(dollar measure) 
Y9901 Z 1.136 -0.423 1.077 1.523 
 Prob > [Z] 0.2558 0.6720 0.2813 0.1277 
Y9802 Z 1.120 -0.020 1.392 1.686 
 Prob > [Z] 0.2628 0.9843 0.1639 0.0919* 
** 5% Significance Level: * 10% Significance Level 
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For the relationships between frequency (variety) of corporate strategic action portfolios 
and performance (H7 and H8), only the count measures for frequency (variety) of corporate 
strategic action portfolios are supportive with ROI indicator at the 10% and 5% significance 
levels respectively. However, when dollar measure is used, the results are insignificant testing 
both frequency and variety constructs. Once again, in the late 1990s’, the RBOCs have been 
involved in the series of mega-billion dollar M&A deals with other telecom operators. Also, they 
have tried to diversify into different layers of info-communication services by investing into the 
Internet start-ups and deploying the high-speed fiber-optic infrastructure. The market has not 
been favorable to all of these strategic investments along with bursting the Internet bubble in the 
1990s’. This can be one of the reasons why the relationship between frequency (variety) of 
corporate strategic action portfolios and firm performance (ROI) shows insignificant results 
when dollar measure is used. 
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Table 12 Frequency (Variety) of Corporate Strategic Action Portfolios and Firm Performance – Alt. 
Random Effects GLS 
Regression 
With Robust SE 
Base Model Base Model H7 H8 H7 H8 
ROA ROI Frequency & ROI Variety & ROI Frequency & ROI Variety & ROI 
Measures   count count dollar dollar 
Wsub 1.03e-07 1.90e-07 2.10e-07 1.94e-07 3.08e-07 3.09e-07 
Z 3.01 2.13 2.42 2.26 3.00 3.02 
P >[Z] 0.003** 0.033** 0.016* 0.024** 0.003** 0.003* 
Uspop -0.0000801 -0.0001572 -0.0001953 -0.00018 -0.0002463 -0.0002422 
Z -2.57 -2.86 -3.47 -3.30 -4.06 -4.03 
P >[Z] 0.010** 0.004** 0.001** 0.001** 0.000** 0.000** 
Nrival 0.0032819 0.0108466 0.0115042 0.0123381 0.0134826 0.0134596 
Z 1.88 3.45 3.62 3.78 4.37 4.38 
P >[Z] 0.060* 0.001** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
Tasset -0.0000219 -0.0000543 -0.0000502 -0.0000505 -0.0000586 -0.0000606 
Z -4.15 -4.96 -4.43 -4.56 -4.00 -4.24 
P >[Z] 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
Promar 0.4131121 0.717757 0.7096546 0.7113675 0.6960949 0.6971286 
Z 8.18 5.88 6.14 6.13 6.36 6.23 
P >[Z] 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
Pcpincome 0.000197 0.00047 0.0005142 0.0004847 0.0006015 0.0006042 
Z 2.63 3.99 4.41 4.29 5.14 5.19 
P >[Z] 0.008** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
Allcountfreq   0.1207337    
Z   2.61    
P >[Z]   0.067*    
LNAllvarietyp    0.1835402   
Z    2.54   
P >[Z]    0.011**   
SQAllrealfreq     0.0001095  
Z     1.11  
P >[Z]     0.266  
SQAllrealvarietyp      0.0000774 
Z      0.81 
P >[Z]      0.420 
** 5% Significance Level: * 10% Significance Level 
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8.0  LIMITATIONS 
Prior to AT&T divestiture in 1984, there had been little considerations for a firm to pursue 
corporate strategic action portfolios since AT&T was the only leading player with significant 
market positions in the market and a firm’s corporate strategic decisions were heavily regulated. 
Telecom Act 1996, a major deregulatory change in the US Telecom industry served as a shock 
that required firms to adapt their strategies to the new rules of the game. 
As this study argues with two dimensions of corporate strategic action portfolios – 
frequency and variety, the impact of deregulatory changes on the RBOCs’ strategic behaviors 
have varied among firms. Some firms have emerged from deregulation as survivors while others 
exited via either bankruptcy or takeover by the surviving RBOCs. Technological changes also 
provide opportunities to increase firms’ flexibility and options in making their services more 
attractive to the market. In return, an increase in technological uncertainty will affect a firm’s 
frequency and variety of corporate strategic action portfolios that may have significant payoffs in 
the future. 
However, this study looks at these two inter-related environmental changes as a stand-
alone effect to the firm’s strategic decision making processes, influencing the firm’s strategic 
considerations rather separately. Clearly, deregulatory and technological changes are inter-
related, and the interactive nature of these environmental changes will play an interesting role in 
formulating and implementing different patterns of a firm’s corporate strategic action portfolios. 
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In other words, by providing consistent rules of competition and usage in the marketplace, 
telecom (de)regulatory policies facilitate the evolution and growth of newly developing 
technologies as can be exemplified in the deployment of 3rd generation (3G) digital cellular 
networks along with the FCC’s spectrum auction policies. As Majumdar & Venkatraman (1998) 
recognized in their study, institutional influences played an important role in a firm’s technology 
adoption decisions. Policy changes from the rate-of-return based regulation to the price-cap 
based regulation enhanced a firm’s incentive to be more technologically efficient since profits 
were influenced by a firm’s cost savings attained from the price-cap in each service bracket 
(Majumdar & Venkataraman, 1998). At state-level, the policy of incentive regulation was 
implemented at different times by the state-level PUCs, and these regulatory changes influenced 
the level of a firm’s new technology investments at state level (Majumdar & Venkataraman, 
1998). Therefore, ‘technology-forcing’ regulatory instruments could have been effective in 
driving a series of technological changes (Lee et al., 2007). 
Also, this study looks at the two most-studied properties of a firm’s corporate strategic 
action portfolios – frequency and variety. Again, these two properties are independently analyzed 
with respect to their performance effects. The effects of frequency and variety of corporate 
strategic action portfolios on performance interact in a subtle way. Shankar & Bayus (2003) 
looked at the home video game industry and questioned why smaller network-sized (in terms of 
customer base) firms (Nintendo) with stronger network strength (the marginal impact of a unit 
increase in network size on demand) overtook the sales of a firm with a larger network size 
(Sega). Their conclusions could be applied to this study that firm performance was a function of 
frequency and variety of corporate strategic action portfolios. It is perhaps a topic for future 
investigations to see which properties of action portfolios might be more influential in 
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determining a firm’s long-term performance. Interacting effects between frequency and variety 
of corporate strategic action portfolios would be related to the uncertainty level of organizational 
task environment (Castrogiovanni, 2002; Milliken, 1987). This study should further extend the 
interaction effects between frequency and variety of corporate strategic action portfolios at 
different environmental uncertainty levels. In addition, further studies should be done in looking 
at the organizational characteristics and action repertoires. For instance, diversity of top 
management teams (TMT) will be related to the characteristics of action repertoires such as 
complexity, change and timing of action portfolios. 
For each hypothesis, further refinement should be considered. The results from H1 to H4 
present very interesting contrasts when count and dollar measures are used.  While prior studies 
have focused on analyzing the strategic action’s count measure, this study indicates that 
alternative measures may produce totally different outcomes. When different types of strategic 
actions are considered, merely counting the total number of actions may produce a deceiving 
signal to analyze the relationships between frequency of corporate strategic action portfolios and 
environmental changes. Due to the limited data availability in dollar value of different action 
types, the literature has been quiet on the alternative measures testing the strategic impact of 
different action types. This study takes a very basic approximation method to use the different 
action types in dollar value. More sophisticated and refined ways to approximate missing data in 
dollar value should be considered. 
To better understand the proactiveness and reactiveness of corporate strategic action 
portfolios on environmental changes as hypothesized in H5 and H6, it will be interesting to 
examine if any variations of a firm’s strategic action proactiveness are detected in the four 
stylized forms of deregulation (Kim & Prescott, 2005). Depending upon different pace and scope 
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dimensions of deregulatory changes, a firm’s willingness to take any specific strategic actions 
proactively or reactively will vary. Also, the study should be refined why different statistical 
results are produced when count and dollar measures are used. For technological changes on the 
reactiveness of corporate strategic action portfolios, are there any other specific drivers (or 
events) to impact on the relationship between technological changes and strategic actions? Since 
the RBOCs are telecom service providers, unlike telecom equipment manufacturers, 
technological changes may have less direct influences on the reactivness of corporate strategic 
actions. 
It will be interesting to see how other performance measures will be related to a firm’s 
strategic actions as hypothesized in H7 and H8. Accounting measures such as ROI and ROA 
have been criticized by focusing too much on firm’s short term performance. Also, it will be 
worthwhile to look at the strategic action versus performance relationships when highly 
publicized mega-billion dollar M&A deals are differently treated in the sample. Even though 
those mega-billion dollar M&A deals are significant enough to change firm’s strategic directions 
in the future, they are too huge deals to achieve positive returns in a short time period. 
Finally, when a firm considers strategic actions, its motives to be involved in such 
strategic actions are not necessarily directed toward enhancing their performance measures. Even 
though a firm’s competitive positioning (measured by the number of rivals in a firm’s service 
areas) is controlled, more refined classification of a firm’s strategic actions will be necessary to 
test the relationship between strategic actions and performance. 
Lastly, frequency and variety of a firm’s corporate strategic action portfolios should be 
moderated by other firm-specific factors such as TMT characteristics. Executives’ propensity to 
adopt particular strategic actions depends on their perception of how well their firms can control 
94 
their business environment and on the costs of introducing such changes into their organizations. 
Since this study only looks at the key incumbents, the RBOCs with similar administrative 
heritages in the US telecom industry, the immediate extension of this study will include different 
types of firms with different administrative heritages (or firms with different organizational 
sizes) in the industry. When compared the market behaviors between entrepreneurial firms and 
established firms in the competitive local exchange telecom industry (Gentry & Jamison, 2004), 
their study showed substantially different investment patterns between these two strategic 
groups. When strategic actions by different types of firms are analyzed, more detailed firm-
specific data should be collected and complemented to the current study’s existing data set. 
95 
9.0  IMPLICATIONS 
Despite the increasing importance of the relationships between public policy and strategy, 
a firm’s strategic actions in response to environmental changes have been often overlooked in the 
policy making processes. Many firms are oftentimes unable to take a holistic view of how 
regulatory and technological changes affect their corporate strategic behaviors (Beardsley et al., 
2005). This study emphasizes the firm’s strategic adaptation mechanism, viewed as a firm’s 
corporate strategic action portfolios, in response to two major environmental changes. It also 
tries to assess the impact of a firm’s corporate strategic action portfolios on firms’ performance 
heterogeneity. In sum, this study builds on the premise that adaptive strategic actions such as 
strategic alliances, M&As, and divestitures are commonly observed in a heavily regulated 
industries such as the US telecom industry, and they tend to vary across firms. 
In this study, I hypothesize that firms demonstrate different patterns of corporate strategic 
action portfolios, and some patterns are more strongly associated with favorable long term 
performance than others. Both regulatory and technological changes increasingly shape the 
structure and conduct of industries and sets in motion major shifts in economic value (Beardsley 
et al., 2005). Successfully navigating these changing processes could allow firms not only to 
manage regulatory and technological risks better but also to shape their industries and to create 
potential opportunities for themselves (Beardsley et al., 2005). 
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Two dimensions of a firm’s corporate strategic action portfolios are examined in this 
study. First, frequency of corporate strategic action portfolios is important when business 
environments become uncertain. When environments become complex and dynamic due to 
deregulatory and technological changes, firms need to reconfigure their resource pools to be able 
to match environmental conditions, and ultimately sustain their competitive advantages.  
Reconfiguring the firm, often defined as corporate restructuring, can be performance-enhancing 
for the firm (Bowman & Singh, 1993). 
As Oliver (1991) offered a typology of different strategic responses to environmental 
changes, this study looks at the occurrence of the alternative strategic actions when deregulatory 
and technological changes occur. In particular, deregulatory changes reset the legitimating 
process through redefining industry norms and shared logic (Scott, 2001; DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983; Oliver, 1991).   As a result, firms explore different types of strategic actions which will be 
competitively adaptable to new regulatory paradigm. In particular for the incumbents (mainly for 
the RBOCs) in the US telecom industry, institutional changes broaden the heterogeneity of 
firms’ strategic actions to search for new opportunities and subsequently extend their necessary 
resources in the new environment. This study indicates that a firm’s strategic actions do increase 
when deregulatory changes occur (H1). When both count and dollar measures are used to test 
H1, the results are significantly consistent with different statistical approaches being used. 
Regarding technological changes, firms should also reconfigure their resource pools by 
executing different strategic actions to adapt to technological (dis)continuities. This study looks 
at the simple relationships between firms’ frequency of corporate strategic action portfolios and 
technological advancement. The results are expected that firms will increase their strategic 
actions in order to adapt to new technological paradigm. The US telecom industry has witnessed 
97 
a series of technological development from the fixed line telecom services to wireless telecom 
services. Along with a wider variety of telecom products are being served and the service 
coverage is extended, convergence of different communications services (i.e. VoIP) requires a 
firm to consider different set of strategic actions. Learning new technologies internally has been 
the most frequently used form of actions among incumbents (RBOCs) since they have led the 
most of technological breakthroughs in the US Telecom industry. As technological changes 
occur, firms begin to compete against new entrants with advanced technological expertise, and 
all lead to more numbers of a firm’s strategic actions responding to technological changes. 
However, this study looks at the one particular event, which is predicted to have a 
significant impact on a firm’s corporate strategic action portfolios. When wireless services were 
commercially recognized in the early 1980’s, they were considered as complementary services to 
the main fixed-line services. Now, wireless services are replacing the fixed-line services, and 
become the key technological backbones of telecom service providers. When wireless 
technology advanced to the third and fourth generations of wireless services, the numbers of 
wireless service subscriptions have began to surpass the number of fixed-line service 
subscriptions since 2000. This event can be considered as one of the most significant 
technological shifts in the US telecom industry, and a firm’s strategic actions are predicted to 
increase accordingly. The results show that frequency of a firm’s corporate strategic action 
portfolios on technological changes (H2) is not supported. However, when count measure is 
alternatively used with negative binomial regression model, H2 shows significant results both 
with t±1 (y9901) and t+2 (y9802) dummy variables being used. 
The above results should be noted with two interesting implications. First, technological 
changes can be very complex processes that a firm’s choices of considering different corporate 
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strategic actions will be different depending upon the nature of technological changes. For 
example, Lavie (2006) presented three mechanisms of capability reconfiguration – substitution, 
evolution, and transformation – that analyzed the incumbents’ responses to technological 
changes. To some extent, the impact of technological changes can be tested on a continuous 
basis, not as a single event impacting on firms’ corporate strategic actions. 
Second, when dollar measure is used, a firm’s frequency of strategic actions on 
technological changes is significantly related. Usually, it takes significant amount of a firms’ 
strategic commitment to deploy new technology infrastructure in the telecom industry. While 
just counting the number of strategic actions will not take into account of a firm’s strategic 
commitment, strategic actions measured in dollar value will provide more fruitful analyses on the 
relationships between a firm’s corporate strategic action portfolios and environmental changes. 
Firm’s variety of corporate strategic action portfolios is the ability to act in various 
arenas, and if the ability is only challenged when environmental pressure forces one’s hand, and 
one must respond quickly, then variety as a viable competitive weapon is only knowable after the 
fact (Bourgeois, III, 1994; 227). In the US telecom industry, a firm’s strategic actions have been 
regulated by FCC. In return, incumbents (e.g. RBOCs) have enjoyed natural monopoly status in 
their regulated coverage areas (e.g. LATAs). Even after AT&T’s divestiture in 1984, the 
RBOCs’ strategic actions were limited to the non-regulated services and their overseas 
operations. Deregulatory changes in 1996 opened up the new opportunities for the RBOCs to 
consider variety of strategic actions. This study partially confirms that a firm’s corporate 
strategic action portfolios do increase when deregulatory changes occur (H3). 
However, when technological changes are considered for a firm’s variety of corporate 
strategic action portfolios, the results are rather insignificant in this study. Once again, the 
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characteristics of technological changes in this study have limited the firm’s choice of strategic 
actions.  As mentioned, this study focuses on the technological changes in the event when 
wireless services have outnumbered the traditional fixed line services. Firms have explored 
various types of telecom services other than wireless services, and the event of technological 
changes in this study may have overlooked them. Also, the speed of technological changes may 
take different forms as the case in the deregulatory changes (Kim & Prescott, 2005), and as a 
result, a firm’s strategic actions to reconfigure their capabilities will be determined accordingly. 
For both frequency and variety of corporate strategic action portfolios, a firm’s strategic 
actions will be sequentially executed as defined as competitive repertoires (Miller & Chen, 
1996). This study looks at another dimension of a firm’s corporate strategic action portfolios, 
competitive speed (Nayyar & Bantel, 1994).  Competitive speed refers to how quickly firms act 
in the event of environmental changes (Nayyar & Bantel, 1994), and this study looks at the 
proactive versus reactive responses to deregulatory and technological changes. A firm’s 
capability to act proactively is likely to achieve superior performance (Lee et al., 2000). 
However, to perform speedy strategic actions, firms should consider additional costs that arise 
from the potential pitfalls of deciding too early before uncertainty has been adequately resolved 
or appropriate measures have been taken to guard against unforeseen events (Wernerfelt & 
Karnani, 1987).  As a result, firms will take reactive responses of their strategic actions to certain 
environmental changes. 
This study shows rather interesting results in regards to a firm’s proactive versus reactive 
responses to environmental changes. Since incumbents (RBOCs in this study) have long history 
of close ties with the regulators in the US telecom industry, they have better positions to prepare 
for such deregulatory changes. As a matter of fact, all RBOCs were active participants in 
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numerous policy making forums and the congressional hearings before 1996 Telecom Act was 
revised and passed in the Congress. Also, lengthy deregulatory process provided them to 
proactively response to deregulatory changes.  The results in this study confirm that a firm’s 
strategic actions (both frequency and variety of corporate strategic action portfolios) will be 
more proactive when deregulatory changes occur (H5). 
On the other hand, when technological changes occur, a firm’s strategic actions are not 
reactive (H6). However, it should be noted that the firm’s reactive strategic responses to 
technological changes are significant when dollar measure is used. Firms will wait and see what 
others do when technological changes are involved with the likelihood of additional costs 
associated with executing strategic actions proactively. In particular, significant strategic 
commitments such as corporate strategic actions in this study will force firms to respond 
reactively to technological changes. 
Lastly, prior studies have shown mixed results about the relationships between frequency 
and variety of corporate strategic action portfolios and performance (Ferrier, 1999, Miller & 
Chen, 1996). A firm with more frequent and various types of strategic actions is supposed to be 
better equipped with sustaining its competitive advantage in response to environmental changes. 
However, too many frequent and diverse strategic actions will deplete a firm’s available 
resources quickly, and ultimately will be incapable of responding to any unforeseen 
environmental changes. 
While prior studies have looked at wide ranges of competitive actions, this study looks at 
the key corporate strategic actions that will directly impact on a firm’s performance. The results 
in this study only confirm the positive relationships between frequency of corporate strategic 
action portfolios and performance (H7) when both count and dollar measures are used. However, 
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H8 is not supportive when count or dollar measures are used. It is due to the fact that a firm’s 
frequent use of various strategic actions results into the detrimental competitive effects of 
industry overcapacity (Porter, 1980) as we have witnessed them during the IT & Internet bubbles 
in the late 1990’s. 
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APPENDIX A 
RESULTS OF INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT ACTIONS 
In addition to the above three major corporate strategic actions, a firm’s internal development 
actions were separately measured and analyzed their influences on the relationships between 
environmental changes and corporate strategic action portfolios in this section. 
A firm’s internal development actions may be equally important to assess the firm’s 
competitive dynamics along with other external strategic actions like M&A and strategic alliance 
actions. In particular for incumbents, the majority of resources and actions are internally 
consumed and the studies using only the external strategic action types may provide us with 
biased results. However, the above arguments can be further elaborated when this study’s use of 
proxy variables in internal development actions is refined, and use more sophisticated ways to 
collect a firm’s internal development actions. 
Since the main data source, SDC, does not report the firm-level internal development 
actions, other telecom industry-specific measures are considered. In this section, the incremental 
increases in the number of a firm’s telecom switches (exchanges) are used as proxy in the FCC’s 
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annual telephone industry infrastructure and service quality reports25
 
. To telecom service 
operators, the number of telecom switches (exchanges) can be considered as one of the key 
determining factors for their internally developed actions. As a firm initiates more internally 
developed corporate strategic actions, the more number of new switches (exchanges) will be 
added. Also, the number of telecom switches (exchanges) will take the significant portions of a 
firm’s capital expenditures, a frequently used dollar value proxy to measure the level of a firm’s 
internal development efforts. The following tables are separately tested results of a firm’s 
corporate strategic action portfolios including internal development actions. 
                                                 
25 Statistical Report, Telephone Industry Infrastructure and Service Quality, Wireline Competition Bureau, FCC 
(www.fcc.gov)  
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Table 13 Summary Statistics at 10% Significance Level (Including Internal Development Actions) 
 Obs = 137 Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Allcountfreq 18.3431 23.4554 1.0000              
2 Allvarietyp 39.3432 27.6457 -0.1588 1.0000             
3 Allrealfreq 7113.314 16430.34  0.1883* 1.0000            
4 Allrealvarp 29.51066 23.4577 0.3633* 0.5835*  1.0000           
5 Y9597 0.1533 0.3616 0.3197* 0.1551 0.1660 0.2170* 1.0000          
6 Y9498 0.2774 0.4493 0.39114*   0.2267* 0.6868* 1.0000         
7 Y9901 0.0729 0.2611      -0.1738* 1.0000        
8 Y9802 0.1241 0.3309     -0.1601  0.7455* 1.0000       
9 Pcpincome 21445.8 5527.201   0.2907*  0.1667 0.2517* 0.2854* 0.3618* 1.0000      
10 Tasset 33323.64 31907.71 -0.1420  0.2432* -0.2189*  -0.2019*   0.6041* 1.0000     
11 Opincome 7803030 7336214   0.2684* -0.1676   0.1678  0.6241* 0.9646* 1.0000    
12 Wsub 259851.3 16183.23   0.3004*  0.1507 0.2483* 0.4639* 0.4861* 0.8714* 0.5278* 0.5649* 1.0000   
13 Uspop 7888.48 1383.583 0.1584  0.2438*  0.1492 0.2259* 0.3358* 0.4157* 0.9146* 0.5649* 0.5960* 0.9448* 1.0000  
14 Nrival 179.438 112.0771 0.1709*       0.1443 0.3219* 0.5577* 0.5492* 0.4501* 0.5312* 1.0000 
* 5% significance level 
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Table 14 Frequency (Variety) of Corporate Strategic Action Portfolios on Deregulatory Changes (Including Internal 
Development Actions) – Alt. I 
ANOVA H1 H1 H3 H3 
Allcountfreq 
(count measure) 
Allrealfreq 
(dollar measure) 
Allvareityp 
(count measure) 
Allrealvarietyp 
(dollar measure) 
Y9597 F 16.80 4.27 4.43 7.98 
 Prob > F 0.0001** 0.0408** 0.0373** 0.0055** 
Y9498 F 27.90 1.15 0.50 8.19 
 Prob > F 0.0000** 0.2855 0.4824 0.0049** 
** 5% Significance Level: * 10% Significance Level 
 
 
Table 15 Frequency (Variety) of Corporate Strategic Action Portfolios on Deregulatory Changes (Including Internal 
Development Actions) – Alt. II 
LSDV H1 H1 H3 H3 
Allcountfreq 
(count measure) 
Allrealfreq 
(dollar measure) 
Allvareityp 
(count measure) 
Allrealvarietyp 
(dollar measure) 
Y9597 t 4.10 2.07 2.10 2.82 
 P > [t] 0.000** 0.041** 0.037** 0.005** 
Y9498 t 5.28 1.07 2.07 2.86 
 P > [t] 0.000*** 0.286 0.041** 0.005** 
** 5% Significance Level: * 10% Significance Level 
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Table 16 Frequency (Variety) of Corporate Strategic Action Portfolios on Deregulatory Changes 
(Including Internal Development Actions) – Alt. III 
Wilcoxon  
Rank Sum Test 
H1 H1 H3 H3 
Allcountfreq 
(count measure) 
Allrealfreq 
(dollar measure) 
Allvareityp 
(count measure) 
Allrealvarietyp 
(dollar measure) 
Y9597 Z -2.990 -1.512 -1.835 -2.479 
 Prob > [Z] 0.0028** 0.1306 0.0665* 0.0132** 
Y9498 Z -3.948 -0.942 -0.649 -2.557 
 Prob > [Z] 0.001** 0.3460 0.5162 0.0106** 
** 5% Significance Level: * 10% Significance Level 
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Table 17 Frequency of Corporate Strategic Action Portfolios on Deregulatory (Technological) Changes 
(Including Internal Development Actions) – Alt. IV 
Negative 
Binomial 
Regression 
H1 H1 H2 H2 
Allcountfreq 
(count measure) 
Allcountfreq 
(count measure) 
Allcountfreq  
(count measure) 
Allcountfreq  
(count measure) 
Y9597 0.2385606    
Z 1.40    
P >[Z] 0.161    
Y9498  0.24743411   
Z  1.52   
P >[Z]  0.130   
Y9901   -0.5424179  
Z   -2.01  
P >[Z]   0.045**  
Y9802    -0.3756434 
Z    -1.76 
P >[Z]    0.078* 
Pcpincome 0.0000619 0.0000564 0.0000749 0.0000772 
Z 3.94 3.27 4.98 5.03 
P >[Z] 0.000** 0.001** 0.000** 0.000** 
Tasset -0.0000257 -0.0000243 -0.0000326 -0.0000327 
Z -2.91 -2.73 -3.78 -3.78 
P >[Z] 0.004** 0.006** 0.000** 0.000** 
Opincome 0.0000987 0.0000973 0.0001334 0.0001313 
Z 2.03 2.02 2.66 2.66 
P >[Z] 0.043** 0.044** 0.008** 0.008** 
** 5% Significance Level: * 10% Significance Level 
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Table 18 Frequency (Variety) of Corporate Strategic Action Portfolios on Technological Changes (Including 
Internal Development Actions) – Alt. I 
ANOVA 
H2 H2 H4 H4 
Allcountfreq 
(count measure) 
Allrealfreq  
(dollar measure) 
Allvareityp  
(count measure) 
Allrealvarietyp  
(dollar measure) 
Y9901 F 0.53 3.13 0.20 1.87 
 Prob > F 0.4682 0.0794* 0.6590 0.1737 
Y9802 F 0.03 1.75 0.75 1.14 
 Prob > F 0.8690 0.1878 0.3896 0.2882 
** 5% Significance Level: 10% Significance Level 
 
 
Table 19 Frequency (Variety) of Corporate Strategic Action Portfolios on Technological Changes 
(Including Internal Development Actions) – Alt. II 
LSDV H2 H2 H4 H4 
Allcountfreq 
(count measure) 
Allrealfreq 
(dollar measure) 
Allvareityp 
(count measure) 
Allrealvarietyp 
(dollar measure) 
Y9901 t -0.73 1.77 -0.44 -1.37 
 P > [t] 0.468 0.079* 0.659 0.174 
Y9802 t -0.17 1.32 1.77 -1.07 
 P > [t] 0.869 0.188 0.079* 0.288 
** 5% Significance Level: * 10% Significance Level 
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Table 20 Frequency (Variety) of Corporate Strategic Actions on Technological Changes (Including 
Internal Development Actions) – Alt. III 
Wilcoxon  
Rank Sum Test 
H2 H2 H4 H4 
Allcountfreq 
(count measure) 
Allrealfreq  
(dollar measure) 
Allvareityp 
(count measure) 
Allrealvarietyp  
(dollar measure) 
Y9901 Z -0.402 -2.325 0.880 1.212 
 Prob > [Z] 0.6880 0.0201** 0.3786 0.2254 
Y9802 Z -1.248 -1.887 1.340 0.983 
 Prob > [Z] 0.2121 0.0592* 0.1801 0.3258 
** 5% Significance Level: * 10% Significance Level 
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Table 21 Proactive versus Reactive Strategic Responses to Environmental Changes (Frequency – Including 
Internal Development Actions) 
LSDV 
Deregulatory 
Changes 
Frequency 
H5 H5 LSDV 
Technological 
Changes 
Frequency 
H6 H6 
Allcountfreq 
(count 
measure) 
Allrealfreq 
(dollar 
measure) 
Allcountfreq 
(count 
measure) 
Allrealfreq 
(dollar 
measure) 
Y9698 t 1.10 1.86 Y0002 t -0.29 1.64 
 P > [t] 0.272 0.066*  P > [t] 0.775 0.103 
Y9498 t 4.84 -1.18 Y9800 t -0.24 0.95 
 P > [t] 0.000** 0.240  P > [t] 0.813 0.343 
** 5% Significance Level: * 10% Significance Level 
 
 
Table 22 Proactive versus Reactive Strategic Responses to Environmental Changes (Variety – Including 
Internal Development Actions) 
LSDV 
Deregulatory 
Changes  
Variety 
H5 H5 LSDV 
Technological 
Changes  
Variety 
H6 H6 
Allvarietyp 
(count 
measure) 
Allrealvarietyp 
 (dollar 
measure) 
Allvarietyp 
(count 
measure) 
Allrealvarietyp 
(dollar 
measure) 
Y9698 t -0.85 0.65 Y0002 t 0.70 -1.32 
 P > [t] 0.394 0.518  P > [t] 0.487 0.188 
Y9498 t 1.79 2.45 Y9800 t -1.43 -0.54 
 P > [t] 0.075* 0.016**  P > [t] 0.155 0.588 
** 5% Significance Level: * 10% Significance Level 
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Table 23 Frequency (Variety) of Corporate Strategic Action Portfolios and Firm Performance (Including Internal Development Actions) 
Random Effects GLS Regression 
With Robust SE 
Base Model Base Model H7 H8 H7 H8 H7 H8 H7 H8 
ROA ROI 
Frequency & 
ROA 
Variety 
&ROA 
Frequency & 
ROA 
Variety & 
ROA 
Frequency & 
ROI 
Variety 
&ROI 
Frequency & 
ROI 
Variety & 
ROI 
Measures   count count dollar dollar count count dollar dollar 
Wsub 1.03e-07 1.90e-07 9.80e-08 1.05e-07 9.46e-08 1.08e-07 1.93e-07 2.12e-07 1.76e-07 2.20e-07 
Z 3.11 2.31 2.91 3.07 2.70 3.14 2.41 2.58 2.10 2.68 
P >[Z] 0.002** 0.021** 0.004** 0.002** 0.007** 0.002** 0.016** 0.010** 0.036** 0.007** 
Uspop -0.0000801 -0.0001572 -0.0000646 -0.0000786 -0.0000663 -0.0000736 -0.0001507 -0.0001876 -0.0001531 -0.0001757 
Z -2.80 -2.79 -2.79 -3.24 -2.80 -3.13 -2.74 -3.23 -2.71 -3.13 
P >[Z] 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.001** 0.005** 0.002** 0.006** 0.001** 0.007** 0.002** 
Nrival 0.0032819 0.0108466 0.0024089 0.0036622 0.0032369 0.0030612 0.0086679 0.0120979 0.0112071 0.010519 
Z 2.29 3.73 1.95 2.97 2.64 2.55 2.94 4.09 3.82 3.67 
P >[Z] 0.022** 0.000** 0.052* 0.003** 0.008** 0.011** 0.003** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
Tasset -0.0000219 -0.0000543 -0.0000157 -0.0000197 -0.0000198 -0.0000171 -0.0000435 -0.0000548 -0.0000556 -0.0000475 
Z -5.07 -5.76 -3.75 -5.06 -4.95 -4.19 -4.35 -5.87 -5.83 -4.88 
P >[Z] 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
Promar 0.4131121 0.717757 0.4276416 -0.4334366  0.4313522 0.7024959 -0.7187688 0.7164601 0.7131105 
Z 28.44 21.36 30.58 31.15  31.05 21.12 21.59 21.28 21.51 
P >[Z] 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**  0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
Pcpincome 0.000197 0.00047 0.0001295 0.0001674  0.0001456 0.0004127 0.0005159 0.0004676 0.0004585 
Z 2.85 4.02 2.65 3.38  3.01 3.55 4.35 3.99 2.82 
P >[Z] 0.004** 0.000** 0.008** 0.001**  0.003** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.005** 
Allcountfreq   0.0086833    0.0245141    
Z   2.31    2.74    
P >[Z]   0.021**    0.006**    
Allvarietyp    0.0052345    0.136024   
Z    1.72    1.87   
P >[Z]    0.085*    0.062*   
Allrealfreq     1.81e-06    0.0000116  
Z     0.34    0.91  
P >[Z]     0.734    0.362  
Allrealvarietyp      0.0072135    0.0197742 
Z      1.96    2.26 
P >[Z]      0.05**    0.024** 
** 5% Significance Level: * 10% Significance Level 
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APPENDIX B 
DESCRIPTIONS OF KEY VARIABLES 
Allcountfreq: frequency of strategic action portfolios (annual count) 
LNAllrealfreq26
SQAllvarietyp: variety of strategic action portfolios (annual count) 
SQAllrealvarp: variety of strategic action portfolios (annual dollar amount) 
: frequency of strategic action portfolios (annual dollar amount)  
y9597: deregulatory changes - Telecom Act 1996±1 yr window dummy variable 
y9498: deregulatory changes - Telecom Act 1996±2 yr window dummy variable   
y9901: technological changes - 3G wireless subscriptions outnumber wire-line 
subscriptions in 2000±1 yr window dummy variable 
y9802: technological changes - 3G wireless subscriptions outnumber wire-line 
subscriptions in 2000±2 yr window dummy variable   
wsub: wireless subscriptions (source: CTIA) 
uspop: US populations (source: US Census Data) 
nrival: number of competitors in each RBOCs' region (source: D&B Million Dollar 
Directory) 
tasset: the RBOCs’ total asset (source: Compustat)  
opincome: the RBOCs’ operating income (source: Compustat) 
pcpincome: average per capital income by the RBOC’s regions (sources: US 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis) 
                                                 
26 Effective date is used from the SDC database. Missing data are coded with averaged real dollar amount, all data 
are converted to real dollar amount (base year 1984) 
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roa: return on assets (source: 10K Report) 
roi: return on investment (source: 10K Report) 
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